In 2006, a Boston jury ordered Eli Lilly to pay roughly $65 million in back royalties, plus a 2.3% running royalty through 2019, on two of its drugs: Evista and Xigris.[1] Lilly had not stolen a compound. It had not copied a formulation. The plaintiffs — Harvard, MIT, the Whitehead Institute, and their licensee Ariad Pharmaceuticals — didn’t own a molecule at all. They owned a patent on a biological mechanism, and they argued that Lilly’s own drugs infringed it simply by working the way drugs work.[2] Four years later, the Federal Circuit erased the verdict entirely.[3]
That case is the sharpest illustration of a question that comes up constantly in pharmaceutical IP: what actually happens when a university (or a government lab, or an academic hospital) discovers a new therapeutic use for a compound or antibody that a pharmaceutical company already owns? The honest answer is that it depends entirely on what was signed before the discovery happened — and when nothing was signed, the university’s odds in court are worse than most people assume.
The Short Answer
Owning a compound and owning a use for that compound are two separate, independently patentable things under U.S. law. A pharmaceutical company’s composition-of-matter or antibody patent does not give it automatic rights to every future application of that molecule, and a university’s discovery of a new mechanism or indication does not give it automatic rights to practice that discovery commercially. In the large majority of real-world cases, the outcome is decided long before the discovery happens, by a material transfer agreement (MTA) or sponsored research agreement that assigns first rights to whoever supplied the compound.[4] When no such agreement exists and the university tries to patent the new use on its own, courts have repeatedly invalidated those patents under the written description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 — because claiming a use is not the same as inventing, or even identifying, the specific molecule that performs it.[3][5]
Two Patent Estates That Rarely Talk to Each Other
What a composition-of-matter or antibody patent actually covers
A composition-of-matter patent claims the molecule itself: its chemical structure, or for a biologic, the amino acid sequence and structural features of the antibody. It is the strongest patent type in pharmaceutical law because it blocks anyone from making, using, or selling that exact molecule for any purpose, approved or not. It is also the type of patent a pharmaceutical company almost never licenses away, since it is usually the foundation of the entire product.
What a method-of-use patent covers instead
A method-of-use patent claims something narrower: administering a compound (someone else’s compound, in this scenario) to achieve a specific therapeutic result — treating a specific disease, in a specific population, at a specific dose or regimen. It does not require owning the molecule. It only requires being the first to invent, and adequately describe, that particular application. This is exactly the kind of patent a university lab is positioned to generate: it runs the mechanistic experiments, not the medicinal chemistry.
Why the Orange Book only lists what the compound owner submits
Here is the detail that most explanations of this scenario skip. The FDA’s Orange Book lists drug substance, drug product, and method-of-use patents, but only the NDA holder can submit a patent for listing, using FDA Form 3542, within 30 days of approval or patent issuance.[6][7] The FDA does not independently verify who actually owns the underlying invention.[7] A university that patents a new method of use for a drug it does not control the NDA for has no independent path to Orange Book listing. It can sue for infringement under ordinary patent law, but it cannot trigger the automatic 30-month litigation stay or force a generic applicant into a Paragraph IV certification the way a listed patent does, unless the compound owner cooperates and submits the patent itself.[6]
The listing asymmetry, stated plainly
A pharmaceutical company’s method-of-use patents get the full protective machinery of Hatch-Waxman. A university’s independently obtained method-of-use patent for the same drug gets none of it automatically. Its only real leverage is direct infringement litigation against whoever is practicing the method commercially — usually the same company that already owns the compound.
What Governs Most Real Cases: The Agreement Signed Before Anyone Discovered Anything
Material transfer agreements and reach-through rights
Most university labs that work with an investigational or marketed compound they don’t own do so under a material transfer agreement. University research offices are explicit about what this means in practice. UC Irvine’s own sponsored-projects guidance states that when a company supplies its drug for testing in a new disease model, the company will typically expect terms “analogous to a full sponsor,” and that a first right to license any resulting invention is customary.[8] The University of Texas System’s model MTA language goes further, having the receiving institution acknowledge upfront that the compound “is the property of Sponsor” and that nothing in the research collaboration transfers those rights.[9]
This is the actual mechanism that resolves the overwhelming majority of “university discovers new use for pharma’s drug” scenarios, and it resolves them quietly, before any patent dispute is even possible. If the university wants access to a proprietary antibody or a not-yet-approved small molecule, it typically has to accept contract terms that hand the company either ownership of, or an exclusive option on, whatever the lab finds.
Why “no strings attached” compound sharing is rare
Companies that supply compounds without reach-through terms are the exception, not the rule, and they say so explicitly when they do it. DuPont’s cre-lox licensing arrangement with NIH is cited in the technology-transfer literature as a case where the company deliberately waived any claim on future NIH discoveries made with its technology.[10] The fact that this arrangement is treated as a landmark, cited by name two decades later, is itself evidence of how unusual it is.
Bayh-Dole’s 60-day invention-disclosure clock
If a university researcher does make a patentable discovery using federally funded resources, the Bayh-Dole Act requires the university to disclose that invention to the funding agency within a set window — commonly described as roughly two months from disclosure by the inventor — and to elect whether it will pursue ownership.[11] Miss that window, or fail to file a patent application, and the government can reclaim title.[11] This creates a second, independent clock running alongside whatever contract governs the compound itself.
What happens if the university publishes before disclosing
U.S. patent law gives inventors a one-year grace period after their own public disclosure to file, but nearly every other major patent system does not. A university lab that publishes a mechanism paper before a provisional application is on file has already lost patent rights everywhere outside the United States, and is racing a one-year clock domestically. Academic incentives (publish first, patent later) and patent incentives (file first, publish later) point in opposite directions, and this is one of the most common ways a genuinely novel discovery ends up unpatentable regardless of how the compound-ownership question would otherwise have been resolved.
What happens when there’s no agreement at all
It is tempting to assume academic research on a marketed drug is protected by a general “research exemption” from patent infringement. It mostly is not. In Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Circuit held that the common-law experimental use defense is limited to acts performed “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry,” and does not cover research that furthers a university’s legitimate business objectives — including ordinary grant-funded academic research.[12][13] In practice, pharmaceutical companies rarely sue academic labs for running mechanism studies on their approved drugs, because doing so is bad for recruiting future collaborators and generates no damages worth collecting. But the legal exposure is real, and it is one more reason serious repurposing work tends to happen inside a contract rather than outside one.
When There’s No Contract and No Compound of Its Own: The University Patents the Method Anyway
The interesting cases — the ones that end up in the Federal Circuit — are the ones where a university identifies a biological mechanism first, patents a broad method of exploiting it, and only afterward discovers that a pharmaceutical company already has a drug that does exactly that. Three cases define this pattern, and all three ended the same way.
The written-description trap: University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle
The University of Rochester’s scientists discovered that the enzyme COX-2, unlike COX-1, is primarily responsible for inflammation, and that selectively inhibiting COX-2 should relieve pain without the stomach damage caused by older NSAIDs.[14] Rochester patented a method for “selectively inhibiting PGHS-2 [COX-2] activity in a human host” by administering a non-steroidal compound that does so.[15] On the day that patent issued in April 2000, Rochester sued Pfizer (by then the owner of Searle’s assets), alleging that Celebrex and Bextra infringed.[15][16]
Rochester had never identified an actual COX-2-selective compound. Its scientists had built the screening assay used to find one, but the patent itself named no such molecule, gave no instructions for making one, and offered nothing showing the inventors had actually possessed one.[14] The Federal Circuit affirmed invalidity for lack of written description in 2004, holding that a patent specification claiming a functionally defined compound must actually demonstrate possession of a working example — not just a plan for finding one.[16][17] The district court, quoting an earlier Federal Circuit ruling, had already framed the underlying problem memorably: an inadequate description that merely identifies a goal “is an attempt to preempt the future before it has arrived.”[18]
The bigger verdict, the bigger reversal: Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly
Ariad’s patent claimed methods of reducing the activity of NF-κB, a transcription factor involved in inflammation and roughly 200 marketed drugs’ mechanisms of action, according to commentary on the case.[19] As in Rochester, the patent’s inventors — based at Harvard, MIT, and the Whitehead Institute — had identified the target pathway but not a specific molecule that modulated it in the claimed way.[2][20] A 2006 jury nonetheless found Lilly’s osteoporosis drug Evista and sepsis drug Xigris infringing, and awarded roughly $65 million in back royalties plus running royalties through the patent’s 2019 expiration.[1][21]
Lilly appealed, and in 2010 the full Federal Circuit — sitting en banc, with nine of eleven active judges in the majority — reversed and invalidated the patent, confirming that Section 112 contains a written description requirement independent of enablement.[3][22] The court’s finding was direct: the specification described only a desired result and a handful of unproven guesses about what might achieve it, never an actual example, tested or even hypothetical, of a molecule that reduces NF-κB activity — and a wish for an outcome is not the same as an invention.[23] An original calculation worth noting: the ‘516 patent’s effective filing date was set at April 21, 1989.[24] From that filing date to final invalidation in 2010 is 21 years — nearly the full statutory term of a patent — during which two commercial drugs carried contingent royalty exposure that ultimately resolved to zero.
The doctrinal ancestor: Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly
Both Rochester and Ariad trace their controlling doctrine back further, to a 1997 case that wasn’t about a method of use at all, but about a compound claim broader than what the university had actually built. UC’s patent on human insulin-encoding cDNA disclosed only the rat version of that sequence, yet claimed the human version and any human-derived microorganism containing it.[25][26] The Federal Circuit held the human-cDNA claims invalid for lack of written description, since disclosing one species (rat) does not describe a different, undisclosed species (human) defined only by its function.[26][27] A 2010 Daedalus (MIT Press) analysis of the doctrine’s evolution ties all three cases together directly, noting that Rochester and Ariad both involved university researchers who “had not actually found an inhibitory compound” but claimed broad methods anyway.[20]
Case
Decided
Institution
Drug(s) at Issue
What Was Claimed
Outcome
Regents of UC v. Eli Lilly
1997
University of California
Humulin (human insulin)
Human insulin cDNA, disclosed only as rat cDNA
Claims invalid, written description
University of Rochester v. Searle/Pfizer
2004
University of Rochester
Celebrex, Bextra
Method of selectively inhibiting COX-2, no compound disclosed
Patent invalid, written description
Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly
2010 (en banc)
Harvard, MIT, Whitehead Institute
Evista, Xigris
Method of reducing NF-κB activity, no compound disclosed
$65M verdict reversed, patent invalid
The Antibody Version of the Same Problem
Enablement instead of written description
When the pharma-owned asset is an antibody rather than a small molecule, the applicable doctrine shifts from written description toward enablement, but the underlying logic is the same: a patent that claims a broad genus defined by function (in the antibody case, binding a particular epitope and blocking a particular receptor) must actually enable a person skilled in the art to make the full scope of what is claimed, not just the specific examples the inventor tested.[28] The Supreme Court applied exactly this reasoning in a unanimous 2023 ruling against Amgen, holding that Amgen’s antibody genus claims covering the PCSK9 target — asserted against Sanofi and Regeneron’s competing antibody — reached far beyond what the patent’s disclosed examples actually enabled.[28] The practical lesson for any university lab working with antibody targets is identical to the small-molecule cases: identifying a target or mechanism is not the same as enabling a claim to every antibody that might hit it.
The Modern Analog: When the Discoverer Isn’t a University At All
CDC v. Gilead: Truvada, Descovy, and a $1 billion demand that ended at zero
The same fact pattern recently played out with a government lab standing in for a university, and it is worth including because it shows the pattern isn’t unique to academic institutions. Gilead’s Truvada was approved in 2004 to treat HIV.[29] CDC researchers, working with Gilead under a long-running collaboration, later helped establish the specific daily dosing regimen that makes the same drug effective as pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) against HIV infection.[29][30] The CDC patented that regimen. In November 2019, the U.S. government sued Gilead for patent infringement, seeking roughly $1 billion, and arguing that Gilead had refused to obtain a license despite CDC’s research contribution.[31][32]
What the jury actually decided, and what it didn’t
In May 2023, a Delaware jury ruled unanimously that Gilead did not infringe the government’s patents, and separately found the patents invalid as obvious.[33][34] The government appealed, won a partial procedural reversal on the infringement question in March 2024, then ultimately withdrew its appeal as part of a January 2025 settlement that closed the litigation entirely.[29] The jury’s obviousness finding is the detail that matters most for this article’s question: the government lost not because CDC’s research contribution was disputed, but because the specific dosing regimen it patented was judged too predictable an extension of existing HIV-treatment science to meet the novelty bar — the same written description and obviousness gauntlet that has defeated university claimants in the small-molecule cases above.
What Happens When It Works: Collaboration Instead of Litigation
Litigated cases dominate the public record because litigation is what generates a court opinion. Quiet, successful licensing deals rarely become case studies, which skews the visible evidence toward conflict. Two real examples show what the cooperative version looks like.
PARP inhibitors: an academic phone call that became Lynparza
In the early 2000s, Alan Ashworth’s lab at the Institute of Cancer Research in London and Thomas Helleday’s lab, then at Sheffield University, independently pursued the same idea: that cancer cells with a faulty BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene might be selectively vulnerable to inhibition of a separate DNA-repair protein, PARP.[35][36] Ashworth’s academic collaborator, Steve Jackson, had co-founded a company called KuDOS to develop PARP inhibitors; when the two groups compared notes, KuDOS sent its compounds directly to Ashworth’s academic lab for testing.[36] Both academic teams published landmark Nature papers in 2005 showing that PARP inhibition selectively killed BRCA-deficient cells.[37][38] AstraZeneca acquired KuDOS that same year and carried the compound, olaparib, through to approval as Lynparza in BRCA-mutated ovarian cancer.[38][39] The academic inventors held rights through the Institute of Cancer Research’s own “rewards to inventors” scheme, jointly with KuDOS and AstraZeneca, rather than through independent litigation.[40]
The mechanism that made this work is the same one described above: the compound moved from company to academic lab under an arrangement that had inventorship and rights worked out in advance, rather than as an afterthought once a discovery already existed.
BiDil: a single inventor’s method patent that built an entire company
The University of Minnesota’s Jay Cohn represents a different pattern entirely: a university researcher whose own method-of-use patent — not the university’s, but his personally, later assigned onward — became the entire commercial asset behind a drug. Cohn patented the method of combining two long-generic vasodilators, hydralazine and isosorbide dinitrate, to reduce heart-failure mortality in 1989, and a second, narrower patent covering their use specifically in Black patients in 2002, after a reanalysis of his own earlier trial data suggested a race-specific treatment response.[41][42] He licensed both patents to a small company, NitroMed, in exchange for equity and future royalties.[43] NitroMed ran the confirmatory trial, and the FDA approved the combination as BiDil in June 2005 — the first drug approved for use in a single self-identified racial group.[42][43]
BiDil is not the same fact pattern as the litigated cases above, because neither hydralazine nor isosorbide dinitrate was owned by anyone; both were decades off-patent. But it is directly relevant to the underlying question, because it shows the other side of the same coin: when no company owns the compound, an academic method-of-use patent can become the sole source of commercial exclusivity for an entire product, rather than a claim against someone else’s.
Case
Compound Owner
Discoverer
Path
Result
Univ. of Rochester v. Searle/Pfizer
Searle/Pfizer
University (independent)
Litigated
Patent invalidated
Ariad v. Eli Lilly
Eli Lilly
Harvard/MIT/Whitehead (independent)
Litigated
$65M verdict reversed, invalidated
CDC v. Gilead
Gilead
CDC (collaborator turned litigant)
Litigated
Not infringed, invalid, settled
PARP/BRCA (Lynparza)
KuDOS/AstraZeneca
ICR London, Sheffield, Newcastle (collaborative)
Licensed in advance
Approved drug, shared inventor rights
BiDil
No one (off-patent)
Jay Cohn, Univ. of Minnesota (independent)
Licensed after filing
Approved drug, sole IP asset
Roughly 67% of university patent licenses go to startups and small businesses rather than established pharmaceutical companies, according to survey data cited in a 2021 update on the Bayh-Dole Act’s effects on technology transfer.[11]
An Original Taxonomy: Four Paths a University Discovery Can Take
Across the cases above, university-discovered new uses for pharma-owned compounds and antibodies sort into four recurring patterns:
Contract-governed discovery. An MTA or sponsored research agreement is signed before the research begins, with reach-through or first-option rights already assigned. Outcome is negotiated quietly, usually before any patent issue becomes public.
Independent literature-based discovery. The university identifies a mechanism from public science, without ever handling the company’s actual compound, and files its own method patent. This is the pattern behind Rochester and Ariad, and it is the highest-litigation-risk path, because the resulting claims tend to describe a goal rather than a possessed invention.
Real-time collaborative discovery. The company supplies its compound directly to an academic lab as part of an active, informal or formal partnership, with inventorship and rights worked out as the science develops. This is the PARP/BRCA pattern.
Off-patent repurposing. The underlying compound isn’t owned by anyone, and the university researcher’s own method-of-use patent becomes the entire basis for a new branded product. This is the BiDil pattern, and it is really a different question — not “who controls the new use of my drug” but “who controls the only patent this drug will ever have.”
What This Means for Brand Manufacturers
A pharmaceutical company that supplies compounds to academic collaborators without negotiated reach-through terms is accepting real risk that a future discovery becomes a competing patent claim rather than an owned asset. The MTA is not paperwork; it is the actual mechanism that determines who owns tomorrow’s use patent. Companies that do get sued by an independent university claimant should also recognize that the written-description and enablement doctrines from Rochester, Ariad, and Amgen v. Sanofi are now well-established defenses against exactly this fact pattern — a university that has identified a mechanism but not built or disclosed a working embodiment of the claimed invention has a structurally weak patent, regardless of how strong the underlying science is.
What This Means for University Technology Transfer Offices
The Rochester-Ariad line of cases is a caution against filing broad, mechanism-level method claims before a specific compound or antibody has actually been reduced to practice in the lab. A narrower claim — tied to the specific molecule the lab actually tested, with actual data — survives written-description scrutiny far better than a claim that covers “any compound that achieves this result.” Tech transfer offices negotiating MTAs with industry sponsors are also negotiating, in advance, which of the four paths above a future discovery will take; the negotiating leverage is almost always higher before the compound is handed over than after a discovery is made.
Methodology
Case selection for this analysis prioritized U.S. Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions squarely addressing patent claims by a research institution (university or government laboratory) against a pharmaceutical or biotechnology company that already held rights to the underlying compound or antibody, cross-checked against primary court opinions (via CourtListener, Justia, and FindLaw case archives) and law-firm case summaries from counsel of record where available. The BiDil and PARP/BRCA case studies were selected as documented examples of non-litigated outcomes, sourced to peer-reviewed publications (New England Journal of Medicine), institutional accounts (Institute of Cancer Research, Cancer Research UK), and contemporaneous science journalism (Scientific American). Financial and timeline figures are drawn from the cited primary sources; the 21-year filing-to-invalidation span for the Ariad patent is an original calculation derived from the effective filing date established at trial and the 2010 en banc invalidation date. This analysis does not attempt to quantify the frequency of quiet, non-litigated licensing arrangements between universities and pharmaceutical companies, since those agreements are typically confidential and do not generate public case law; the cases discussed here should not be read as representative of all university-industry drug repurposing collaborations, most of which never become public disputes.
Key Takeaways
Owning a compound or antibody and owning a new use for it are legally separate rights; neither automatically includes the other.
Most real-world outcomes are decided by the material transfer agreement signed before the research starts, not by patent litigation after a discovery is made.
Three major Federal Circuit rulings — Regents of UC v. Eli Lilly (1997), University of Rochester v. Searle/Pfizer (2004), and Ariad v. Eli Lilly (2010, en banc) — all invalidated university-held claims for failing to disclose an actual working compound or antibody, not for lacking scientific merit.
A 2023 unanimous Supreme Court ruling in Amgen v. Sanofi applied the equivalent enablement doctrine to broad antibody genus claims.
An independently obtained university method-of-use patent has no automatic path to FDA Orange Book listing; only the NDA holder can submit a patent for listing.
The CDC’s 2019–2025 litigation against Gilead over Truvada/Descovy PrEP patents shows the same dynamic applies to government research labs, not only universities; the government’s claims were found not infringed and invalid as obvious.
Successful, non-litigated outcomes exist and tend to follow either advance contractual agreement (PARP inhibitors/Lynparza) or a scenario where no company owned the underlying compound at all (BiDil).
FAQ
Can a university patent a new use for a drug it doesn’t own the compound for?
Yes. A method-of-use patent does not require owning the underlying compound or antibody, only being the first to invent and adequately describe that specific therapeutic application. Federal Circuit case law shows this succeeds far more often when the patent claims a specific, actually-tested embodiment rather than a broad functional class of compounds.[3][16]
Does a pharmaceutical company automatically own new uses discovered using its drug?
No, not automatically. Ownership of any new discovery depends on the terms of whatever material transfer agreement or sponsored research agreement governed the university’s access to the compound. Where no such agreement exists, ownership follows ordinary inventorship rules, and the university researcher (or the university itself, if federally funded) may hold the resulting patent.[8][9]
What is the difference between a composition-of-matter patent and a method-of-use patent?
A composition-of-matter patent claims the molecule or antibody itself, blocking its manufacture, use, or sale for any purpose. A method-of-use patent claims a specific way of administering a compound to achieve a specific therapeutic result, without claiming the compound itself.
Can a university’s method-of-use patent be listed in the FDA Orange Book?
Only if the NDA holder — typically the pharmaceutical company, not the university — submits it for listing using FDA Form 3542. The FDA does not independently verify underlying ownership.[6][7] A university holding an unlisted method patent can still sue for infringement, but without Orange Book listing it does not trigger the automatic 30-month litigation stay against generic entrants.
What happens if a university researcher publishes findings before filing a patent application?
U.S. law provides a one-year grace period after an inventor’s own public disclosure, but most other major jurisdictions (including Europe) do not, meaning publication before filing typically forecloses patent rights outside the United States immediately and starts a one-year domestic filing clock.
What is a material transfer agreement and why does it decide most of these outcomes?
An MTA is the contract governing how a research material — including a proprietary compound or antibody — moves from a company to a university lab. Industry-supplied MTAs commonly include reach-through or first-option license terms covering any resulting invention, which is why the contract signed before research begins usually determines who owns a subsequent discovery, not a later patent dispute.[8][9]
Does the Bayh-Dole Act give universities automatic ownership of drug-related discoveries?
For inventions made using federal funding, Bayh-Dole allows (but does not automatically grant) the university to elect ownership, subject to a disclosure obligation to the funding agency, generally described as roughly two months from the inventor’s disclosure, and an obligation to attempt commercialization.[11] The federal government retains march-in rights if the university does not pursue commercialization, though march-in has rarely been exercised.[36][37]
Can a pharmaceutical company be sued just for using a drug the way a university later patented?
Yes, this is exactly what happened in University of Rochester v. Searle/Pfizer and Ariad v. Eli Lilly. Both companies were sued for ordinary commercial sale of drugs they had already developed and marketed, on the theory that the drugs’ known mechanism of action infringed a university-held method patent. Both patents were ultimately invalidated.[3][16]
What is the “written description” requirement, and why does it keep defeating university method patents?
Section 112 of the Patent Act requires a patent specification to demonstrate that the inventor actually possessed the full scope of the claimed invention as of the filing date, separate from merely enabling someone to eventually make it.[22] Universities that identify a biological target or mechanism, but have not found or disclosed an actual compound or antibody that hits it, are structurally likely to fail this test, because the specification describes a research goal rather than a completed invention.
What happens when there’s no contract and no valid patent — can a pharmaceutical company just use the discovery for free?
In practice, often yes. If a university’s method claim is later invalidated, or if the discovery was never patented at all (common when it comes from published, peer-reviewed research rather than proprietary lab work), a pharmaceutical company that independently developed or already marketed a drug using that mechanism owes nothing. This is the practical result in both Rochester and Ariad, and it is a significant part of why serious university technology transfer offices increasingly prioritize narrow, compound-specific claims and advance licensing agreements over broad, litigation-dependent method patents.
References
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Requirements, Benefits, and Possible Consequences of Listing Patents in FDA’s Orange Book. Finnegan LLP. https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/requirements-benefits-and-possible-consequences-of-listing-patents-in-fdas-orange-book.html
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University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). Justia. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp2/249/216/2460752/
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Eisenberg, Rebecca S. “Universities: The Fallen Angels of Bayh-Dole?” Daedalus, MIT Press, Vol. 147, No. 4 (2018). https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article/147/4/76/27224/Universities-The-Fallen-Angels-of-Bayh-Dole
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