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Last Updated: December 29, 2025

Litigation Details for In Re Glumetza Antitrust Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2019)


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Small Molecule Drugs cited in In Re Glumetza Antitrust Litigation

Details for In Re Glumetza Antitrust Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2019)

Date Filed Document No. Description Snippet Link To Document
2019-09-18 188 Order on Motion to Dismiss 21 6,340,475; 6,635,280; 6,488,962; and 6,723,340. Lupin had successfully designed around the … 16 for the patent barrier remains. New brand-drug applicants must list the patents (if any) covering…brand drug, that the relevant patents have expired, or that such patents are invalid or will not be … or invalidity against the four relevant patents: U.S. Patent Nos. …infringe the patents 4 because it designed around the patents using a External link to document
2019-09-18 347 Order on Motion to Certify Class 10 6,340,475; 6,635,280; 6,488,962; and 6,723,340. Assertio Therapeutics, Inc. (then owner of … or invalidity against the four relevant patents: U.S. Patent Nos. …analogous anticompetitive behavior, patent misuse, by holding a patent …from an alleged reverse-payment settlement of a patent 17 infringement…restating. This case arises from a perversion of the patent and pharmaceutical- External link to document
2019-09-18 537 Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment AND Order on Administrative Motion to File Under Seal AND Order on Administrative Motion to File Under Seal AND Order on Administrative Motion to File Under Seal ,488,962, which expired in June 2020, and No. 6,723,340, which will expire in October 2021. …’475, ’280, and ’962 patents (it also asserted but later dropped the ’340 patent). …This argument runs afoul of patent fundamentals. True, we presume a patent’s validity. See …within the scope of the patent. The royalty payment from the licensee to the patent owner … 19 In a secret pharmaceutical-patent infringement settlement agreement, concealed from External link to document
2019-09-18 593 Order on Administrative Motion to File Under Seal AND Order on Administrative Motion to File Under Seal AND Order on Administrative Motion to File Under Seal AND Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief AND Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief AND Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief AND Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief AND Order on Administrative Motion to File Under Seal AND Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief AND Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief 24 and 6,488,962 (“the ’962 patent”). More specifically, Attorney Lentz states…equivalents, for U.S. Patent Nos. 6,340,475 (“the ’475 patent”), 6,635,280 (“the ’280 patent”), …475, ’280, and ’962 patents, as well as U.S. Patent Nos. 7,736,667 (“the ’667 patent”) and Northern District… 7 the entire corporate-patent lifecycle, handling everything from patent prosecution to advising …on the ’962 patent would jump to 85 to 90% if Lupin prevailed on the ’475 and ’280 patents External link to document
>Date Filed >Document No. >Description >Snippet >Link To Document

Litigation Summary and Analysis for In Re Glumetza Antitrust Litigation | 3:19-cv-05822-WHA

Last updated: August 5, 2025


Overview of the Litigation

The case In Re Glumetza Antitrust Litigation (3:19-cv-05822-WHA) centers on allegations that certain pharmaceutical companies engaged in illegal anti-competitive practices to extend market exclusivity and suppress generic competition for Glumetza, a drug used in managing type 2 diabetes. The lawsuit, filed in the Northern District of California, consolidates claims against Aurora Healthcare Corporation, Avanthi, Inc., and related corporate entities, alleging violations of federal antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act, and state laws pertaining to unfair competition and restraint of trade.

Background and Allegations

Glumetza is a controlled-release formulation of metformin approved by the FDA for diabetes management. Its original patent protections provided market exclusivity; however, as patent protections expired, generic manufacturers sought approval to introduce lower-cost versions. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant firms employed a series of anti-competitive strategies to delay generic entry, including:

  • Strategic patenting and litigation tactics to create patent thickets, thereby prolonging market exclusivity.
  • Filing baseless patent infringement lawsuits designed solely to impose delays under the Hatch-Waxman Act.
  • Engaging in settlement agreements that included "pay-for-delay" clauses, effectively paying generics to stay off the market.
  • Obstruction of FDA approval processes by filing additional patent claims and patent challenges.

These alleged maneuvers are argued to violate federal antitrust laws by unlawfully maintaining monopoly power and delaying affordable generic competition.

Procedural Status of the Litigation

The litigation began with multiple class action and direct purchaser actions filed in 2019, consolidating into the multidistrict litigation (MDL) in the Northern District of California. As of the latest filings, key procedural milestones include:

  • Pleadings: Multiple amended complaints detail specific conduct and damages, with detailed allegations regarding patent manipulation and strategic litigation.
  • Discovery: Extensive discovery phases are underway, including document productions, depositions, and expert analyses focusing on patent prosecution histories, settlement agreements, and FDA approval timelines.
  • Motions: Several motions to dismiss have been filed and are pending, primarily challenging the sufficiency of antitrust allegations.
  • Trial Dates: No trial has yet been scheduled; ongoing pre-trial proceedings aim to streamline issues for potential trial or settlement.

Legal Analysis

1. Antitrust Violations:

The crux of the plaintiffs’ claims rests on demonstrating that defendant conduct constituted an unlawful restraint of trade. The allegations echo classic anti-competitive patterns, notably "product hopping" via strategic patenting and patent assertion campaigns that extended market exclusivity beyond statutory patent terms. Courts require plaintiffs to show:

  • A relevant market—here, the market for extended-release metformin formulations.
  • Monopoly power within this market.
  • An anticompetitive effect, such as delays in generic entry.
  • A causal link between defendant conduct and harm to consumers and competitors.

2. Patent Manipulation and "Sham" Litigation:

The case emphasizes the use of opportunistic patent strategies, including filing secondary patent applications and undertaking litigation tactics that lack a genuine innovation basis. The "sham litigation" doctrine may be invoked if courts find that patent suits lacked merit and were intended solely to impede entry, a key factor in establishing antitrust violations.

3. Pay-for-Delay Settlements:

Settlement agreements that compensate generics to delay market entry are per se illegal under the FTC v. Actavis, Inc. doctrine, unless they meet certain procompetitive justifications. The plaintiffs argue these agreements extended the patent monopoly beyond legal boundaries, suppressing competition.

4. Challenges and Defenses:

The defendants likely assert that patent protections and legitimate litigation were standard industry practices emphasizing patent rights and innovation. They may argue that any delays result from valid patent disputes and that their conduct does not meet the antitrust standard for illegality, emphasizing policy considerations balancing patent rights and competitive markets.

Implications for the Pharmaceutical Industry

This litigation underscores ongoing concerns over patent strategies and settlement practices within the pharma sector. Regulators and courts are increasingly scrutinizing "pay-for-delay" and patent manipulation practices, aiming to promote competition and reduce drug prices. The outcome of In re Glumetza could set significant precedents regarding the permissible scope of patent rights and settlement agreements.

Potential Outcomes

  • Settlement: Given the complexities and the economic stakes, the case may resolve via settlement, potentially involving substantial damages and injunctive relief.
  • Judicial Rulings: Courts may issue dispositive rulings on whether defendant conduct qualifies as antitrust violations, which could terminate or accelerate the case’s progression.
  • Legislative and Regulatory Impact: High-profile cases like this can influence future policy and enforcement activities, possibly resulting in stricter scrutiny of patent practices and settlement agreements.

Key Takeaways

  • The case highlights the importance of scrutinizing patent strategies that could be deemed anti-competitive.
  • Allegations of sham litigation and pay-for-delay tactics remain central concerns for antitrust regulators.
  • Successful plaintiffs must establish concrete anticompetitive effects linked directly to patent and settlement practices.
  • The evolving legal landscape seeks to balance patent rights with the need for prompt, affordable generic drug entry.
  • Ongoing discovery and legal arguments will shape the standards for anti-competitive conduct in pharmaceutical patent law.

FAQs

1. What are the core allegations against the defendants in In Re Glumetza?
The allegations assert that the defendants engaged in patent manipulation, sham patent litigation, and settlement practices—including pay-for-delay agreements—to unlawfully extend their market monopoly and block generic competition.

2. How do patent strategies relate to antitrust laws in this case?
While patents are protected rights, using them to institute malicious litigation or to unjustly delay competition can breach antitrust laws. The case examines whether defendant patent tactics crossed this line.

3. What is the significance of FTC v. Actavis, Inc. in this litigation?
Actavis established that pay-for-delay settlements are subject to antitrust scrutiny and can be deemed illegal per se if they lack procompetitive justifications, influencing the analysis in this case.

4. What will be the impact if the plaintiffs succeed?
A ruling in favor of plaintiffs could lead to restrictions on certain patent and settlement practices, higher damages, and increased enforcement actions against similar anti-competitive strategies within the industry.

5. Could this case affect other pharmaceutical patent litigation?
Yes. The case's conclusions could clarify the boundaries of patent rights and settlement agreements, influencing legal standards and industry behavior across the pharmaceutical sector.


Sources

  1. In Re Glumetza Antitrust Litigation, No. 3:19-cv-05822-WHA, Northern District of California.
  2. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
  3. Federal Trade Commission, “Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Settlements Delay Consumer Access to Lower-Cost Drugs,” 2013.
  4. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, “Patent Litigation and Antitrust Law,” 2022.
  5. Bloomberg Law, “Pharmaceutical Patent Strategies and Antitrust Implications,” 2023.

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