{"id":40089,"date":"2026-11-17T11:21:00","date_gmt":"2026-11-17T16:21:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/?p=40089"},"modified":"2026-11-04T10:03:28","modified_gmt":"2026-11-04T15:03:28","slug":"your-patent-thicket-isnt-protecting-revenue-its-advertising-the-drugs-value-to-every-challenger-watching","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/your-patent-thicket-isnt-protecting-revenue-its-advertising-the-drugs-value-to-every-challenger-watching\/","title":{"rendered":"Your Patent Thicket Isn&#8217;t Protecting Revenue \u2014 It&#8217;s Advertising the Drug&#8217;s Value to Every Challenger Watching"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"572\" src=\"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-7.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-40092\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-7.png 1024w, https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-7-300x168.png 300w, https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/image-7-768x429.png 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">AbbVie&#8217;s US Humira revenue fell 34.7 percent to $12.16 billion in 2023, the first year of biosimilar competition. [5] That is the revenue of a drug that, by one count, had 257 patent applications filed on it and 130 granted patents. [4] The patents delayed entry. They did not prevent it. Seven biosimilar developers were already named in settlement news before the first launch. [8]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This article tests a simple claim: a large patent portfolio does not hide a drug&#8217;s value. It records that value in public. A generic or biosimilar company reads the portfolio, the listing dates, and the litigation history as a price tag. The evidence below shows that sales drive patent challenges, and that thickets are one visible result of high sales. It does not show that thickets cause challenges. I mark that limit where it matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Short Answer: Does a Patent Thicket Attract Challengers?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A patent thicket does not stop challengers from coming. High sales bring them, and the thicket is a public record of the sales a brand company expects to defend. In a study of 214 new molecular entities, the log of maximum yearly sales was positive and significant in every model of challenge likelihood. [1]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The thicket also gives a challenger a map. The patents that the brand adds late, such as formulation and method patents, are the ones the brand loses most often in court. In the top sales quintile of that study, generic companies won 71 percent of litigated outcomes on formulation-only patents. Brand companies won 3 percent. [1]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Five Findings That Matter<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Each finding below can be quoted alone. The source column shows where each number comes from. &#8220;Calculated&#8221; means I derived the figure from the cited numbers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>#<\/th><th>Finding<\/th><th>Source<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>1<\/td><td>Of 214 FDA-approved new molecular entities (1994-2006 approvals), 64 percent had at least one Orange Book patent challenged.<\/td><td>Grabowski et al. (2017) [1]<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>2<\/td><td>For drugs with sales above $1 billion, the median time from approval to first challenge fell from about seven years (1994-1998 approvals) to four years (1999-2006 approvals). Four years is the earliest possible date.<\/td><td>Grabowski et al. (2017) [1]<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>3<\/td><td>In the top sales quintile, formulation-only patents lost in court to generic companies 71 percent of the time. Active-ingredient patents lost 3 percent of the time.<\/td><td>Grabowski et al. (2017) [1]<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>4<\/td><td>Humira US net revenue was $12.16 billion in 2023, down 34.7 percent. The implied 2022 figure is about $18.6 billion (calculated).<\/td><td>AbbVie (2024) [5]<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>5<\/td><td>With one generic producer, the median generic price was 38.6 percent below the brand price. With six producers, it was 93.9 percent below (AMP basis).<\/td><td>Conrad and Lutter, FDA (2019) [11]<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two more findings come from regulators and courts. Between November 2023 and May 2025, the FTC sent three rounds of Orange Book warning letters that covered more than 100, more than 300, and more than 200 patents or listings. [13][12] In December 2024, the Federal Circuit affirmed an order that forced Teva to delist five ProAir HFA patents. [12]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Methodology: What I Reviewed and What I Did Not<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What data did I analyze?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I reviewed public documents: one peer-reviewed study summary, one FDA analysis, company results releases, an SEC filing, FTC warning-letter summaries from law-firm reports, court-outcome reports, and Humira patent counts from I-MAK. I did not pull raw Orange Book or Purple Book data. The FDA website did not allow download from my working environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How did I select records?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I picked four products with documented patent-based delay and public challenger activity: Humira (adalimumab), Revlimid (lenalidomide), Eliquis (apixaban), and Entresto (sacubitril\/valsartan). I picked them because primary or near-primary records exist for each. This is not a random sample. It is a set of illustrations, not a statistical test.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How did I calculate derived figures?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I label every derived number &#8220;calculated.&#8221; Percentage changes use the percentages in the source. Date gaps count calendar days or months between two dated events. Price indexes in the scenario table multiply a $100 brand price by the FDA median price ratio.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What are the limits?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Patent counts differ by source and date. I-MAK reported 247 applications in 2018 [3] and 257 applications on its later Humira page. [4] The two counts are not the same, and I show both. Source summaries I fetched did not always give a publication date. Where a date is missing, the reference list says &#8220;n.d.&#8221; I did not verify post-2023 Humira revenue in a primary source, so I stop the revenue series at fiscal year 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Definitions: Terms Used in This Analysis<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What is a patent thicket?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A patent thicket is a group of overlapping patents on one product. The group usually includes a core compound patent and later patents on formulations, methods of use, dosing, devices, and manufacturing. Counts differ by method. I-MAK counts applications and granted patents for Humira. [4]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What is a Paragraph IV challenge?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A Paragraph IV challenge is a generic applicant&#8217;s statement that a listed brand patent is invalid or not infringed. It applies to small-molecule drugs under the Hatch-Waxman system. A new molecular entity can draw such a filing four years after approval, which Grabowski et al. call the earliest possible date. [1]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How do biologics differ?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Biologics such as Humira do not sit in the Orange Book. Biosimilar makers deal with brand patents under the BPCIA process. The Humira record in this article comes from settlement news and PTAB records, not from Paragraph IV filings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What does &#8220;challenge&#8221; mean here?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I use &#8220;challenge&#8221; for any move that tests a patent: a Paragraph IV certification, a petition for inter partes review (IPR), a biosimilar patent suit, or a request to delist a patent. Each move costs the challenger money. Each one shows that the challenger thinks the drug is worth the cost.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How Does a Patent Thicket Signal a Drug&#8217;s Value?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Patents are public. A company with a large revenue stream to defend files more patents on it. A challenger can read the filing history. The history shows which drugs the brand company fights for, how late it adds patents, and which patent types it relies on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Why do challengers read patent portfolios as revenue maps?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A challenger spends money on every case. Grabowski et al. found that the log of maximum yearly sales was positive and significant at the 1 percent level in every logistic model of challenge likelihood. [1] The marginal effect was 0.172 on core-patent challenge and 0.188 on active-ingredient challenge in the reported models. [1] A challenger who sees a deep portfolio sees a brand that has judged the drug worth the filing fees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What do late-filed patents tell a challenger?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Late filing is a signal of its own. I-MAK reported that 89 percent of Humira&#8217;s US patent applications were filed after FDA approval, and that nearly half were filed since 2014. [3] Its later Humira page gives 90 percent. [4] The raw counts are I-MAK&#8217;s, not a court&#8217;s. They still show the pattern a challenger sees: new filings keep arriving as the drug nears its loss of exclusivity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Does the portfolio show where the weak patents are?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Yes. Outcomes differ by patent type. The table below shows the top-quintile outcomes in Grabowski et al. [1] The layers added later are the layers that lose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Patent type (top sales quintile)<\/th><th>Brand wins<\/th><th>Generic wins<\/th><th>Settlements<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Active ingredient<\/td><td>55%<\/td><td>3%<\/td><td>42%<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Method of use<\/td><td>19%<\/td><td>33%<\/td><td>46%<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Formulation only<\/td><td>3%<\/td><td>71%<\/td><td>26%<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Source: Grabowski et al. (2017), as reported. [1] The sample covers 116 patents across 41 NMEs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What the Data Shows: Sales Drive Challenges<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finding reported by Grabowski, Brain, Taub, and Guha (2017): for drugs with sales above $1 billion, the median time from approval to patent challenge fell from about seven years for 1994-1998 approvals to exactly four years for 1999-2006 approvals, the earliest possible date. [1]<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How fast do challengers arrive on blockbusters?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">They arrive on the first day the law allows. For drugs above $1 billion, the median challenge came exactly four years after approval in the later cohort. [1] For drugs below $1 billion, the median fell from just under 10 years to just over 5 years in the 2003 cohort. [1] The gap between the two groups is the clearest measure of what sales do to challenger behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How common are challenges overall?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the sample, 64 percent of NMEs had at least one patent challenged. [1] Challenges rose from 54 percent in the 1995 cohort to a peak of 79 percent in the 2003 cohort. [1] Core-patent challenges rose from 34 percent to a peak of 69 percent over the same cohorts. [1]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Did the 2003 law change raise the rate?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The authors report that post-MMA approvals were about 29 percent more likely to face a core-patent challenge and about 21 percent more likely to face an active-ingredient challenge. [1] Both effects were significant at the 1 percent level. [1] The study&#8217;s sample ends with 2006 approvals, so it does not describe the years after that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What did the challenges cost brands in market life?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Average effective market life for top-quintile drugs fell from 14.5 years (1994-1998) to 12.2 years (post-MMA). [1] NMEs with a successful active-ingredient challenge averaged 11.7 years, against about 13.7 years for those without one. [1] Hemphill and Sampat asked the same question in 2012: whether challenges target high-sales drugs. [2]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Humira Case Study: The Largest Thicket Still Had a Queue at the Door<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How many patents protected Humira?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I-MAK reported 247 patent applications in December 2018. [3] Its later Humira page reports 257 applications and 130 granted patents. [4] From those two figures, about 51 percent of the applications were granted (calculated). I-MAK&#8217;s count measures filings. It does not measure how many patents a challenger would have to beat in court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Did the thicket stop biosimilar makers from trying?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">No. Before entry, the press named at least seven developers: Amgen, Boehringer Ingelheim, Sandoz, Fujifilm Kyowa Kirin Biologics, Biogen, Fresenius Kabi, and Coherus. [8] Several filed IPR petitions. The PTAB denied institution of IPRs against Humira formulation patents filed by Amgen and Coherus. [10] On February 9, 2018, it denied two more petitions from Sandoz, against US 9,512,216 and US 8,802,100. [10]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The thicket held in those proceedings. It also pulled challengers into repeated, public fights. Each fight added a record that the next challenger could read.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What did the settlements look like?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">AbbVie settled with most challengers and licensed US entry for 2023. Amgen&#8217;s license start was January 31, 2023. [8] Samsung Bioepis was set for June 30, 2023. [9] Pfizer was set for November 20, 2023. [9] The report said Boehringer Ingelheim had not settled at that time and was fighting AbbVie&#8217;s claims in court. [9]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Event<\/th><th>Date<\/th><th>Source<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Sandoz IPR petitions denied (US 9,512,216 and US 8,802,100)<\/td><td>Feb. 9, 2018<\/td><td>[10]<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Amgen license start (Amjevita)<\/td><td>Jan. 31, 2023<\/td><td>[8]<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Samsung Bioepis license start<\/td><td>June 30, 2023<\/td><td>[9]<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Pfizer license start<\/td><td>Nov. 20, 2023<\/td><td>[9]<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Spread, first to last of the three dates<\/td><td>293 days (calculated)<\/td><td>Analysis of [8][9]<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What does the 293-day spread mean?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It means entry was a managed queue, not one event. The date gap from Amgen to Samsung Bioepis is 150 days. The gap from Samsung Bioepis to Pfizer is 143 days. Both are calculated from the dates above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What happened to revenue?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Humira&#8217;s global net revenue was $14.404 billion in 2023, down 32.2 percent. [5] US net revenue was $12.16 billion, down 34.7 percent. [5] International net revenue was $2.244 billion, down 14.3 percent. [5] The US figure was about 84 percent of the global figure (calculated).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Humira&#8217;s global sales in 2022 were $21.2 billion. [7] The US figure for 2022 that follows from the 34.7 percent decline is about $18.6 billion (calculated). That makes the first-year US drop about $6.5 billion (calculated). It is a revenue difference, not a profit difference, and it includes rebate and price effects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Humira was about 27 percent of AbbVie&#8217;s total net revenues in 2023. [6] AbbVie states in its 10-K that Humira faces biosimilar competition in the United States after the loss of exclusivity in 2023. [6]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Why does the Humira record matter for the signal argument?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It matters because every public step was a data point. A challenger could read the patent count, the filing dates, the denied IPRs, and the settlement dates. They all pointed to one fact: this drug earned enough money that AbbVie would defend it for years, and enough that others would pay to wait in line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Revlimid Case Study: The Staircase Pays Challengers Too<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What did the PTAB decide in 2019?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In February 2019, the PTAB declined to invalidate three Revlimid patents in a challenge from Dr. Reddy&#8217;s. [17] Analysts at the time expected that result to keep generics out until at least 2023. [17]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What did the settlements allow?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Bristol Myers Squibb announced the Dr. Reddy&#8217;s settlement on September 17, 2020. [16] Dr. Reddy&#8217;s would get a volume-limited license after March 2022, and unlimited sales no earlier than January 31, 2026. [16] Natco Pharma would start limited sales in March 2022, at mid-single-digit percentages of volume, rising to as much as one-third. [17] Alvogen would start at up to single-digit percentages after March 2022. [17] All three could sell unlimited generics from January 31, 2026. [17]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Revlimid sales were $5.8 billion in the first half of 2020. [17]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How long was the staircase?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From March 2022 to January 31, 2026 is about 46 months (calculated). From the February 2019 PTAB result to the March 2022 first limited entry is about 37 months (calculated). The patents held for 37 months. Then they turned into a paid schedule for challengers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What does Revlimid show about signals?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A strong portfolio still gave each challenger a negotiated share. The brand kept most of the volume for 46 months. It also created a known path for the next challenger: win a PTAB result or a trial slot, then bargain for volume. A public schedule of this kind is itself information for any later filer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Eliquis and Entresto: When the Portfolio Gets Tested<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What did the Federal Circuit decide on Eliquis?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On September 3, 2021, the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision from August 2020. The court held that both US 6,967,208 (composition of matter) and US 9,326,945 (formulation) were valid and infringed. [14] Generic makers cannot launch apixaban before April 1, 2028, subject to further appeals and challenges. [14]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">From the 2021 ruling to the April 1, 2028 date is about 79 months (calculated).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Why does the Eliquis outcome not refute the signal argument?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Eliquis shows a thicket that held. The same case shows the cost of holding it: the brand had to win in district court and on appeal. The challengers still got a fixed entry date. A fixed date, once public, is a clear target for planning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What happened with Entresto?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On December 4, 2024, the Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court that Novartis had not shown it was likely to win its suit against MSN Pharmaceuticals. The panel saw no clear error. Novartis lost its bid to block MSN&#8217;s generic Entresto (sacubitril\/valsartan). [15]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The same report says Novartis had filed a citizen petition in September 2022. The petition asked FDA to wait until the three-year exclusivity period ended on February 16, 2024, and to avoid approving applications that referenced two Entresto patents. FDA denied the petition in July 2024. [15] The report gives expiration dates of August 22, 2033 and May 9, 2036. [15]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What does Entresto show about late patents?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It shows a brand that kept stacking defenses after the lead patent dispute began. A citizen petition, a preliminary injunction motion, and later patents all tell a challenger the same thing: the revenue is large, and the brand will use every tool.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Case comparison: four drugs, one pattern<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Drug<\/th><th>Active ingredient<\/th><th>Brand company<\/th><th>Documented outcome<\/th><th>Calculated metric<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>Humira<\/td><td>adalimumab<\/td><td>AbbVie<\/td><td>Licensed US entry Jan.-Nov. 2023; US revenue $12.16B in 2023 [5][8][9]<\/td><td>293-day entry spread; about 51% grant rate on I-MAK count<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Revlimid<\/td><td>lenalidomide<\/td><td>Bristol Myers Squibb (Celgene)<\/td><td>Volume-limited entry from Mar. 2022; unlimited from Jan. 31, 2026 [16][17]<\/td><td>About 46-month staircase<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Eliquis<\/td><td>apixaban<\/td><td>Bristol Myers Squibb and Pfizer<\/td><td>Two patents upheld; no generic before Apr. 1, 2028 [14]<\/td><td>About 79 months from ruling to entry date<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>Entresto<\/td><td>sacubitril\/valsartan<\/td><td>Novartis<\/td><td>Federal Circuit let MSN&#8217;s generic proceed, Dec. 4, 2024 [15]<\/td><td>Citizen petition filed Sept. 2022; denied July 2024<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Four Signals a Patent Portfolio Sends (Original Framework)<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is my own classification, not an industry standard. It sorts what a challenger can read from a public portfolio into four signal types. Each type matches a documented fact in this article.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Signal 1: The volume signal<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Volume is the patent count. For Humira, I-MAK counted 247 applications in 2018 [3] and 257 later. [4] A high count tells a challenger that the brand has spent heavily. It does not say how strong any one patent is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Signal 2: The timing signal<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Timing is the filing date relative to approval. I-MAK reported that 89 percent of Humira&#8217;s US applications came after FDA approval. [3] Late filings point to a brand that is still adding protection as exclusivity nears its end.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Signal 3: The weakness signal<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Weakness is the patent type. In the top sales quintile, formulation-only patents lost to generics in 71 percent of litigated outcomes. [1] A portfolio that is mostly formulation and method patents tells a challenger where to aim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Signal 4: The defense signal<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Defense is how the brand responds. Humira&#8217;s IPR record, [10] Entresto&#8217;s citizen petition, [15] and Revlimid&#8217;s staged settlements [17] each show a brand that will fight and a brand that will bargain. A challenger can price both.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How do the four signals combine?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A portfolio with high volume, late timing, weak patent types, and visible defense is the most readable. It tells a challenger that revenue is large, that new patents keep coming, that some patents are vulnerable, and that settlement is possible. The inverse portfolio, with few patents and one strong compound claim, tells a challenger less.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Is this framework tested?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">No. I built it from the documented cases above. No study I reviewed measures whether any one signal raises the number of challenges. The sales effect in Grabowski et al. is the only statistical result I verified. [1]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>The Regulatory Layer: FTC Orange Book Challenges and Teva v. Amneal<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How many listings has the FTC challenged?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The FTC has sent three rounds of warning letters about Orange Book listings. The counts below are the minimum figures reported by law-firm summaries. The rounds may overlap, so I do not add them. The May 2025 round went to companies that had not delisted after earlier letters. [12]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Round<\/th><th>Companies<\/th><th>Scope reported<\/th><th>Source<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>November 2023<\/td><td>10<\/td><td>More than 100 patents; 13 inhaler and 4 epinephrine-pen products; 14 patents delisted across six NDAs<\/td><td>[13]<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>April 30, 2024<\/td><td>10<\/td><td>More than 300 listings across 20 products<\/td><td>[13]<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>May 21, 2025<\/td><td>Not named in source<\/td><td>More than 200 patents on 17 brand-name products<\/td><td>[12]<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What did the Federal Circuit decide in Teva v. Amneal?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In December 2024, the Federal Circuit affirmed an order that required Teva to delist five patents tied to its ProAir HFA inhaler. [12] The court held that a patent must claim at least the drug&#8217;s active ingredient to be listed. A patent that claims only a device component does not qualify. [12] It denied en banc rehearing in March 2025. [12]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Why does listing matter for the signal argument?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A listing is a public statement that a patent covers the drug. A listing that survives has legal weight. A listing that fails shows a weak spot. When the FTC and a court strike a listing, the brand&#8217;s own portfolio becomes evidence of where it was thin. The FTC has argued that improper listings can cause substantial harm to competition and to consumers, in its November 2023 amicus brief in Mylan v. Sanofi-Aventis. [13]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What does this mean for biologics?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Orange Book does not cover biologics, so the FTC letters do not apply to Humira. The signal logic still applies. Biologic patents are exposed through BPCIA patent exchange, IPR filings, and settlement terms, as the Humira record shows. [10][8][9]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What Are Challengers Betting On? Price Erosion by Number of Entrants<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How far do generic prices fall as entrants increase?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The FDA analyzed products with initial generic entry from January 2015 through December 2017. It used CMS average manufacturer prices (AMP) and IQVIA invoice data. [11] The median generic-to-brand price ratio fell as producers increased.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><thead><tr><th>Generic producers<\/th><th>Median price ratio (AMP)<\/th><th>Implied decline (calculated)<\/th><th>Illustrative price if brand = $100<\/th><\/tr><\/thead><tbody><tr><td>1<\/td><td>0.614<\/td><td>38.6%<\/td><td>$61.40<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>2<\/td><td>0.465<\/td><td>53.5%<\/td><td>$46.50<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>3<\/td><td>0.322<\/td><td>67.8%<\/td><td>$32.20<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>4<\/td><td>0.212<\/td><td>78.8%<\/td><td>$21.20<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>5<\/td><td>0.144<\/td><td>85.6%<\/td><td>$14.40<\/td><\/tr><tr><td>6<\/td><td>0.061<\/td><td>93.9%<\/td><td>$6.10<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Source: Conrad and Lutter, FDA (December 2019). [11] Decline equals one minus the median ratio. The last column applies the ratio to a $100 brand price for illustration only.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Why does this table explain challenger behavior?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first generic entrant faces a price about 39 percent below the brand. Each added producer cuts the price further. A challenger wants to be early, because the price falls fast when others join. A challenger also wants a large market, because a 39 percent discount on a large base is still a large revenue. A thicket that signals large sales raises the base. That is the commercial logic behind the pattern in finding 2.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Does this apply to biosimilars?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The FDA study covers generic small-molecule products. I did not verify an equivalent median price-ratio table for biosimilars. The Humira figures in this article show a revenue effect, not a price ratio.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Scenario Analysis: What a Challenger Reads From Three Portfolios<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These scenarios use stated assumptions. They are not forecasts, and no source predicts these outcomes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Scenario A: High volume, late filing, formulation-heavy<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Assume a drug with a large portfolio, most patents filed after approval, and most claims on formulation or method of use. Under the Grabowski outcome pattern, the weakest layers are the most common ones. [1] A challenger sees many targets and a good chance to win or settle. Expected result: early challenges, as in the 4-year median for above-$1 billion drugs. [1]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Scenario B: Few patents, one strong compound claim<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Assume a drug with a single active-ingredient patent. In the same study, active-ingredient patents lost to generics in 3 percent of litigated top-quintile outcomes. [1] A challenger sees one hard target. High sales may still draw a challenge, because sales drive challenges. [1] But the odds per case favor the brand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Scenario C: Large portfolio with a visible settlement ladder<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Assume a portfolio like Revlimid&#8217;s after settlements. The ladder is public: limited volume from March 2022, unlimited from January 31, 2026. [17] A later challenger can read the ladder and plan around it. The brand has bought time at the cost of sharing volume.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What is the common point across scenarios?<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In all three, the challenger prices the opportunity from public records. The brand&#8217;s task is to know what those records say before the challenger reads them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What This Means for Brand Manufacturers<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Audit your portfolio as a challenger would<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Count patents by type. Mark each patent&#8217;s filing date against approval. Compare your formulation and method patents to the top-quintile outcome table. [1] If most of your protection sits in the layers that lose, your thicket advertises a weakness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Check every listing<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Under Teva v. Amneal, a listed patent must claim at least the active ingredient. [12] The FTC has challenged listings in three rounds. [13][12] A listing that fails costs more than the patent. It gives the challenger a public record of your portfolio decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Plan for a queue, not a single event<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Humira record shows a queue of settlements with entry dates across 2023. [8][9] The Revlimid record shows volume tiers. [17] A plan that assumes one cliff date will miss the staging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Where does DrugPatentWatch fit?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">DrugPatentWatch is a database that brings together Orange Book listings, patent expiration data, Paragraph IV litigation, and PTAB records. A brand team can use it to review how a product looks from the challenger&#8217;s side: patent counts by product, listing dates, and challenge filings. It does not replace the court record or the FDA database for any claim in a decision memo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What This Means for Generic and Biosimilar Challengers<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Rank targets by sales first<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sales were the one variable with a verified, statistically significant link to challenge in the study. [1] Rank by sales, then look at patent type.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Read the weak layers<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Formulation-only patents lost in court in 71 percent of top-quintile outcomes. [1] Method-of-use patents lost 33 percent of the time, and settled 46 percent of the time. [1] Active-ingredient patents are harder.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Price the settlement option<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the Humira and Revlimid records, most challengers settled for dated or volume-limited entry. [8][9][17] A challenger who files should model a settlement outcome as a base case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What the Evidence Does Not Show<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Does a thicket cause more challenges?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I did not find a verified study that isolates the effect of patent count on challenge rates after controlling for sales. The title claim, that a thicket advertises value, is an inference. It rests on the sales effect [1] and on documented challenger behavior in four cases. It is not a measured causal result.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Did the thicket fail to protect revenue?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">No. US Humira revenue still rose 7.4 percent in 2022, the year before biosimilar entry. [7] Revlimid&#8217;s patents held for about 37 months after the 2019 PTAB result (calculated from [17]). Eliquis&#8217;s patents were upheld on appeal. [14] The accurate claim is narrower: protection bought time, and it also made the drug&#8217;s value easy to read.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What data would test the claim?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A test needs, for each drug, the number and type of patents at each date, the sales level, and the date of each challenge. A regression of challenge timing on patent count, controlling for sales, would answer the question. The Orange Book, the Purple Book, PACER, and the PTAB database hold the inputs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Objection: Should Brands File Fewer Patents Then?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Is the delay worth the signal?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Probably yes, on the numbers in this article. A year of delay on Humira was worth a US revenue gap of about $6.5 billion in the first year of entry (calculated from [5]). The Eliquis ruling fixed a date about 79 months after the appeal decision (calculated from [14]). No filing cost in the record comes close to those figures. The argument here is not &#8220;file less.&#8221; It is &#8220;know what the filings say.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Does a smaller portfolio hide the value?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Not by much. Sales are visible in company results. AbbVie reported Humira revenue by region every quarter, and a 10-K states that Humira was about 27 percent of total net revenues in 2023. [5][6] A challenger does not need the patent count to know a drug is worth the fight. The patent record adds detail: where the brand is weak, and how it responds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What should a brand team measure each quarter?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Four numbers fit the framework above: patent count by type, the share of patents filed after approval, the number of open challenges (IPR, Paragraph IV, or BPCIA), and the dated entry schedule from any settlements. Each number comes from a public record. A team that tracks all four sees its portfolio as a challenger does.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Key Takeaways<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>High sales drive patent challenges. In the 214-NME study, the sales effect was significant at the 1 percent level in every model. [1]<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>For above-$1 billion drugs, the median challenge came at exactly four years after approval, the earliest possible date. [1]<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Formulation-only patents lost to generics in 71 percent of top-quintile litigated outcomes. Active-ingredient patents lost in 3 percent. [1]<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Humira&#8217;s US net revenue fell 34.7 percent to $12.16 billion in 2023. [5] Entry dates spread across 293 days among the three dated licenses (calculated). [8][9]<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Revlimid&#8217;s settlement ladder ran about 46 months from limited to unlimited entry (calculated). [16][17]<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The FTC challenged more than 100, more than 300, and more than 200 patents or listings in three rounds. The rounds may overlap. [13][12]<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The evidence supports &#8220;sales attract challenges.&#8221; It does not yet prove &#8220;patent count attracts challenges.&#8221;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>FAQ<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Do patent thickets prevent generic or biosimilar entry?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">No. They delay it. Humira&#8217;s biosimilar entry was licensed for 2023 after years of patent filings and IPR proceedings. [8][9][10]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How soon do generic companies challenge a blockbuster drug?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For drugs above $1 billion in sales, the median challenge came four years after approval in the 1999-2006 approval cohort. Four years is the earliest possible date. [1]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Which brand patents lose most often in court?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the top sales quintile of the Grabowski et al. sample, formulation-only patents lost to generics in 71 percent of litigated outcomes. Method-of-use patents lost in 33 percent. Active-ingredient patents lost in 3 percent. [1]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How many patents protect Humira?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I-MAK reported 247 patent applications in 2018 [3] and 257 applications with 130 granted patents on its later Humira page. [4] These are filings and grants counted by I-MAK. They are not a count of patents that a challenger had to litigate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How much did Humira revenue fall after biosimilars launched?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">US net revenue fell 34.7 percent to $12.16 billion in 2023. Global net revenue fell 32.2 percent to $14.404 billion. [5]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What did the FTC do about Orange Book listings?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It sent warning letters in November 2023, April 2024, and May 2025. [13][12] The Federal Circuit later affirmed that Teva had to delist five ProAir HFA patents. [12]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What must a patent do to qualify for Orange Book listing?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Under the Federal Circuit&#8217;s December 2024 holding in Teva v. Amneal, it must claim at least the drug&#8217;s active ingredient. A patent that claims only a device component does not qualify. [12]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>How much do generic prices fall as more companies enter?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On an AMP basis, the median generic price was 38.6 percent below the brand with one producer and 93.9 percent below with six. These figures come from the FDA&#8217;s analysis of 2015-2017 initial entries. [11]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>What happened when Novartis tried to block generic Entresto?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On December 4, 2024, the Federal Circuit let the lower court&#8217;s decision stand. Novartis had not shown it was likely to win against MSN Pharmaceuticals. [15]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>When can generic apixaban (Eliquis) launch in the US?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After the Federal Circuit&#8217;s September 3, 2021 ruling, generic makers cannot launch before April 1, 2028, subject to further appeals and challenges. [14]<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>References<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Grabowski, H., Brain, C., Taub, A., &amp; Guha, R. (2017). Pharmaceutical patent challenges: Company strategies and litigation outcomes. <em>American Journal of Health Economics, 3<\/em>(1), 33-59. Retrieved from Cornerstone Research summary: https:\/\/www.cornerstone.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/Pharma-Patent-Challenges.pdf<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Hemphill, C. S., &amp; Sampat, B. N. (2012). Evergreening, patent challenges, and effective market life in pharmaceuticals. <em>Journal of Health Economics, 31<\/em>(2), 327-339. https:\/\/ideas.repec.org\/a\/eee\/jhecon\/v31y2012i2p327-339.html<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>I-MAK. (2018, December 18). Report finds 89% of total U.S. patent applications on Humira were filed after FDA approval, pointing to a deliberate strategy to delay competition. https:\/\/www.i-mak.org\/2018\/12\/18\/report-finds-89-of-total-u-s-patent-applications-on-humira-were-filed-after-fda-approval-pointing-to-a-deliberate-strategy-to-delay-competition\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>I-MAK. (n.d.). Overpatented, overpriced: Humira special edition. https:\/\/www.i-mak.org\/humira\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>AbbVie Inc. (2024). AbbVie reports full-year and fourth-quarter 2023 financial results. https:\/\/www.biospace.com\/abbvie-reports-full-year-and-fourth-quarter-2023-financial-results<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>AbbVie Inc. (2024). Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. https:\/\/www.sec.gov\/Archives\/edgar\/data\/1551152\/000155115224000011\/abbv-20231231.htm<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>BioProcess International. (n.d.). The final hurrah? Humira sales hits $21.2 bn in 2022. https:\/\/www.bioprocessintl.com\/global-markets\/the-final-hurrah-humira-sales-hits-21-2-bn-in-2022<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fierce Pharma. (n.d.). Thanks to Amgen biosim settlement, AbbVie&#8217;s $20B Humira forecast looks real. https:\/\/www.fiercepharma.com\/pharma\/abbvie-s-humira-patents-hold-up-as-amgen-settles-2023-biosim-launch<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fierce Pharma. (n.d.). AbbVie inks Humira patent deal No. 7, delaying Pfizer&#8217;s U.S. biosim launch until late 2023. https:\/\/www.fiercepharma.com\/pharma\/abbvie-inks-humira-patent-deal-no-7-delaying-pfizer-s-u-s-biosim-launch-until-late-2023<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Goodwin Procter, Big Molecule Watch. (2018, February 13). PTAB denies institution of IPR on two Humira patents. https:\/\/www.goodwinlaw.com\/en\/insights\/blogs\/2018\/02\/ptab-denies-institution-of-ipr-on-two-humira-patents<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Conrad, R., &amp; Lutter, R. (2019, December). Generic competition and drug prices: New evidence linking greater generic competition and lower generic drug prices. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. https:\/\/fda.gov\/media\/133509\/download<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>McDermott Will &amp; Emery. (2025). FTC revives Orange Book listing challenges. https:\/\/www.mwe.com\/?p=320171<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Mayer Brown. (2024, May). US FTC continues aggressive scrutiny of pharmaceutical patents listed in the Orange Book. https:\/\/mayerbrown.com\/ja\/insights\/publications\/2024\/05\/us-ftc-continues-aggressive-scrutiny-of-pharmaceutical-patents-listed-in-the-orange-book<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Bristol Myers Squibb-Pfizer Alliance. (2021, September 3). Bristol Myers Squibb-Pfizer Alliance pleased with decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. https:\/\/www.pfizer.com\/news\/announcements\/bristol-myers-squibb-pfizer-alliance-pleased-decision-us-court-appeals-federal<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>PharmaLive. (2024, December 5). Novartis loses appeal to bar Entresto generic from U.S. market. https:\/\/www.pharmalive.com\/?p=253566<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Bristol Myers Squibb. (2020, September 17). Bristol Myers Squibb announces settlement of U.S. patent litigation for REVLIMID (lenalidomide) with Dr. Reddy&#8217;s. https:\/\/www.biospace.com\/bristol-myers-squibb-announces-settlement-of-u-s-patent-litigation-for-revlimid-lenalidomide-with-dr-reddy-s<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fierce Pharma. (n.d.). After patent win at PTO, BMS inks Revlimid settlement with Dr. Reddy&#8217;s. https:\/\/www.fiercepharma.com\/pharma\/after-patent-win-at-pto-bms-inks-revlimid-settlement-dr-reddy-s<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>AbbVie&#8217;s US Humira revenue fell 34.7 percent to $12.16 billion in 2023, the first year of biosimilar competition. 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