{"id":39548,"date":"2026-09-03T10:51:00","date_gmt":"2026-09-03T14:51:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/?p=39548"},"modified":"2026-08-27T09:24:58","modified_gmt":"2026-08-27T13:24:58","slug":"platform-patents-were-supposed-to-protect-gene-editing-fourteen-years-of-crispr-litigation-say-otherwise","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/platform-patents-were-supposed-to-protect-gene-editing-fourteen-years-of-crispr-litigation-say-otherwise\/","title":{"rendered":"Platform Patents Were Supposed to Protect Gene Editing. Fourteen Years of CRISPR Litigation Say Otherwise."},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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On March 26, 2026, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ruled, again, that the Broad Institute invented CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing in eukaryotic cells before the University of California, the University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier did. It was the second time the PTAB had reached that conclusion in the same interference. A federal appeals court had already vacated the first version of the ruling and sent it back. The Board’s March 2026 decision was reaffirmed in June 2026.[1][2]<\/sup> Two more interferences, involving the Korean gene-editing company ToolGen and Sigma-Aldrich, remain paused, waiting for this fight to finish first.[3]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Count from Broad’s first priority filing on December 12, 2012, and the question of who owns the foundational patent on CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing in human cells has now been litigated for more than thirteen years, across two separate interference proceedings, two Federal Circuit appeals, and at least one more round still to come. This is what a platform patent looks like in gene editing: not a fence that keeps competitors out, but a decade-plus legal proceeding that keeps everyone, including the patent owner, unsure of exactly what they hold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Analysts tracking the global patent landscape count 17,590 CRISPR-related patent families worldwide, with the University of California, Harvard, Regeneron, MIT, and the Broad Institute holding the largest individual positions.[4]<\/sup> None of that density has settled the underlying question of priority. It has mostly multiplied the number of parties who can assert a claim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Short Answer<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A platform patent covers a foundational method, not a single molecule. In gene editing, that distinction matters more than in small-molecule pharma, because dozens of unrelated therapeutic programs depend on the same handful of underlying patents. When priority is contested at that foundational layer, every downstream company inherits the uncertainty. The CRISPR-Cas9 dispute between Broad and the University of California group (collectively, CVC) has run since 2014, survived two Federal Circuit appeals, and remains open as of mid-2026.[1][2]<\/sup> A separate Broad patent covering the same technology was revoked outright in Europe over an inventorship formality.[14]<\/sup> Vertex Pharmaceuticals paid up to $100 million to license Cas9 rights from Editas Medicine in December 2023, after its therapy Casgevy was already FDA-approved, precisely because the underlying ownership question was still unresolved.[25]<\/sup> Multiple companies, including Sangamo Therapeutics and a Novartis-partnered Intellia program, shelved competing sickle cell disease programs rather than race Vertex to market.[27]<\/sup> None of this looks like deterrence working as designed. It looks like litigation risk that platform patents generate rather than prevent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Is a Platform Patent in Gene Editing, and How Is It Different From a Drug Patent?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A small-molecule drug patent typically claims a specific compound, a specific formulation, or a specific method of use tied to one product. A platform patent in gene editing claims the underlying editing mechanism itself: the guide RNA architecture, the nuclease, the delivery chemistry, or the method of cutting DNA at a target site. One platform patent can sit upstream of dozens of unrelated clinical programs across cancer, sickle cell disease, cardiovascular disease, and inherited blindness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That structural difference changes the litigation math. A Paragraph IV challenge to a small-molecule patent affects one drug and one company’s revenue. A priority dispute over a gene-editing platform patent affects every company that has built a product on that platform, whether or not those companies are party to the underlying case. DrugPatentWatch’s own patent-landscaping work on small-molecule portfolios generally tracks a bounded set of listed patents tied to one approved product.[a]<\/sup> Gene-editing platform disputes have no equivalent boundary. The CRISPR interference covers the technology, not a product, so its outcome touches every company using it, regardless of indication.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The CRISPR-Cas9 Priority War, 2012-2026<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The dispute traces to two independent scientific claims filed within a year of each other. The University of California, University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier filed U.S. Application No. 13\/842,859 on March 15, 2013, describing a CRISPR-Cas9 system not limited to any specific cell type. The Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard filed a competing application limited to use in eukaryotic cells, exemplified by U.S. Patent No. 8,697,359.[5]<\/sup> Broad paid a fee to expedite review and secured the first issued patent, in April 2014, ahead of the CVC group’s applications.[9]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interference I: No Interference-in-Fact (2014-2018)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office declared the first interference proceeding in January 2016, later docketed as Interference No. 106,048, covering thirteen Broad patents and one application against fourteen CVC applications.[1]<\/sup> In a February 15, 2017 decision, the PTAB found there was no interference-in-fact: Broad’s claims to CRISPR-Cas9 use in eukaryotic cells were not obvious in light of CVC’s broader claims, because contemporaneous statements from the CVC inventors themselves expressed uncertainty about whether the system would work in eukaryotic cells at all.[7]<\/sup> The Federal Circuit affirmed that decision on September 10, 2018, finding the PTAB had properly weighed the evidence and declining to reweigh it on appeal.[5][6]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Interference II: Priority, Reversed, Priority Again (2019-2026)<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

A second interference, No. 106,115, addressed a narrower and more commercially direct question: which group first invented a single-guide RNA CRISPR-Cas9 system for cutting or editing DNA in eukaryotic cells. In September 2020, the PTAB granted Broad priority benefit and denied CVC’s request for benefit of its two earliest provisional applications, making Broad the senior party.[24]<\/sup> On February 28, 2022, the PTAB ruled on the merits: Broad had priority.[1]<\/sup> CVC appealed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On May 12, 2025, the Federal Circuit issued a precedential decision (Nos. 22-1594 and 22-1653) that split the difference. It affirmed the PTAB’s underlying framework but found the Board had legally erred by conflating the distinct standards for conception of an invention and reduction to practice, vacating that portion of the ruling and remanding.[8]<\/sup> Jacob Sherkow, a University of Illinois law professor who has tracked the dispute since 2016, called it a partial win for the University of California, which would get another chance to prove its scientists conceived the invention first.[9]<\/sup> The underlying appeal had run 1,123 days from filing to decision.[10]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On remand, the PTAB applied the clarified conception standard, defined as a definite and permanent idea of a complete and operative invention, such that a person of ordinary skill could reduce it to practice without further invention.[13]<\/sup> Applying that standard, the Board again found that CVC’s evidence reflected ongoing, unresolved experimentation rather than a completed conception, while Broad had demonstrated actual reduction to practice.[13]<\/sup> The PTAB reaffirmed Broad’s priority on March 26, 2026, and let that decision stand on further review in June 2026.[2][11][12]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Date<\/th>Proceeding<\/th>Outcome<\/th>Source<\/th><\/tr><\/thead>
Dec. 12, 2012<\/td>Broad Institute priority filing<\/td>First provisional application specific to eukaryotic cells<\/td>[1]<\/td><\/tr>
Mar. 15, 2013<\/td>CVC (UC\/Vienna\/Charpentier) filing<\/td>Broader claims, not cell-type limited<\/td>[5]<\/td><\/tr>
Apr. 2014<\/td>Broad’s first patent issues<\/td>Fast-tracked ahead of CVC<\/td>[9]<\/td><\/tr>
Feb. 15, 2017<\/td>Interference No. 106,048 decision<\/td>No interference-in-fact; Broad’s patents stand<\/td>[7]<\/td><\/tr>
Sep. 10, 2018<\/td>Federal Circuit affirms<\/td>PTAB decision upheld<\/td>[5]<\/td><\/tr>
Sep. 2020<\/td>Interference No. 106,115 priority benefit<\/td>Broad named senior party<\/td>[24]<\/td><\/tr>
Feb. 28, 2022<\/td>PTAB priority decision<\/td>Broad awarded priority<\/td>[1]<\/td><\/tr>
May 12, 2025<\/td>Federal Circuit (Nos. 22-1594, 22-1653)<\/td>Vacated-in-part, remanded on conception standard<\/td>[8]<\/td><\/tr>
Mar. 26, 2026<\/td>PTAB decision on remand<\/td>Broad again awarded priority<\/td>[11]<\/td><\/tr>
Jun. 24, 2026<\/td>PTAB reaffirmation<\/td>Priority decision stands<\/td>[2]<\/td><\/tr>
Ongoing<\/td>Interferences with ToolGen and Sigma-Aldrich<\/td>Paused pending Broad\/CVC outcome<\/td>[3]<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n
\n

A back-of-the-envelope estimate from Jacob Sherkow put the value of unresolved CRISPR-Cas9 royalty rights at “easily tens of millions” of dollars a year, or roughly $100 million over the life of the patent \u2014 a figure he offered specifically because nobody involved could calculate it precisely while ownership remained contested.[19]<\/sup><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

What Happens When a Formalities Error Sinks a Platform Patent: The EPO Revocation<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The U.S. dispute is not the only front. In Europe, Broad’s foundational patent EP2771468 was revoked outright in January 2018, upheld on appeal in January 2020, and the revocation is now final.[14][16]<\/sup> The defect had nothing to do with who invented what first. Broad’s European application claimed priority from a set of U.S. provisional applications, one of which listed an additional inventor, Luciano Marraffini, who was not carried forward as an applicant on the European filing. Marraffini’s rights had instead been assigned to Rockefeller University, which was never listed on the later application.[15]<\/sup> Under settled EPO practice, a priority claim is only valid if all applicants (or their successors) on the earlier filing are also named on the later one. Because that was not the case, the patent lost its earliest priority date, and two intervening publications became novelty-destroying prior art.[14][15]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The revocation did not touch Broad’s other pending CRISPR-Cas9 applications in Europe or its Cas12a (Cpf1) patents, and the institute has continued prosecuting related filings.[16]<\/sup> But the episode is instructive on its own terms: a multi-institution, multi-inventor platform patent carries an administrative fragility that a single-assignee small-molecule patent does not. The more institutions and co-inventors sit behind a foundational claim, the more places a filing can go wrong, and the less that risk has to do with the underlying science.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Surrogate Licensing Model: Turning Universities Into Landlords<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Because the underlying patents sit with universities and research institutes rather than product companies, both sides of the CRISPR dispute adopted what Jorge Contreras and Sherkow have termed a surrogate licensing model: grant one company exclusive rights to commercialize the patents for human therapeutics, and let that company sublicense to others.[b]<\/sup> Broad, Harvard, and MIT granted Editas Medicine an exclusive worldwide license to their Cas9 and Cas12a patent estates for human therapeutic development in December 2014.[22]<\/sup> On the CVC side, the University of California and University of Vienna granted an exclusive, sublicensable license to Caribou Biosciences, which in turn sublicensed most human therapeutic rights exclusively to Intellia Therapeutics, while Charpentier separately licensed CRISPR Therapeutics and ERS Genomics.[1][35]<\/sup> In December 2016, the co-owners and their licensees, the Regents of the University of California, the University of Vienna, Charpentier, Caribou, Intellia, CRISPR Therapeutics, and ERS Genomics, signed a global cross-consent and invention management agreement to coordinate prosecution, defense, and enforcement of the CVC patent family across seven distinct parties.[36]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Editas, for its part, has sublicensed target-specific rights downstream: a deal worth up to $737 million with Juno Therapeutics for CAR-T applications, and $90 million from Allergan for eye disease.[23]<\/sup> Beam Therapeutics separately licensed base-editing rights from Harvard, the Broad Institute, MIT, and Editas, then sublicensed cardiovascular applications to Verve Therapeutics.[32][34]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This structure is efficient in one sense: it lets a single company negotiate individual field-of-use deals rather than forcing every therapeutic developer to separately track two universities, two foreign institutions, and multiple named individual inventors. It is inefficient in another: each sublicense is a new contract with its own interpretation risk, sitting on top of an already-contested foundational patent. That risk is not hypothetical. In 2019, Intellia and Caribou went to arbitration over how their 2014 license agreement applied to a specific set of guide RNA modifications, with an interim award addressing which company retained rights to structural guide changes for human therapeutics.[37]<\/sup> The dispute did not touch the foundational patents at all. It was a disagreement between two licensees, one degree removed from the underlying interference, over the scope of a sublicense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Licensing After Approval: What the Vertex-Editas Deal Reveals<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The clearest evidence that platform-patent uncertainty shapes commercial behavior more than it prevents competition is the timing of Vertex Pharmaceuticals’ license from Editas Medicine. Vertex and CRISPR Therapeutics received FDA approval for Casgevy (exagamglogene autotemcel), the first CRISPR-based gene-editing therapy cleared in the United States, on December 8, 2023.[26]<\/sup> Casgevy had already received conditional marketing authorization in the United Kingdom the previous month and in Bahrain.[28]<\/sup> Only after the U.S. approval, on December 12, 2023, did Vertex agree to pay Editas up to $100 million plus additional licensing fees for rights to the Cas9 gene-editing patent estate that Editas exclusively licenses from Broad, Harvard, MIT, and Rockefeller University.[25]<\/sup> Editas has stated that a portion of Vertex’s payments will flow through to Broad and Harvard, according to filings made with the SEC.[25]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In other words, a company brought a CRISPR-based product through pivotal trials and to FDA approval while a foundational ownership dispute over the underlying technology was still working through interference proceedings and appeals, and only settled the license after the product was already on the market. That is not what platform patents are supposed to enable. A patent is supposed to let its owner exclude a downstream user until that user pays for a license. Casgevy’s timeline shows the opposite sequence: commercialize first, license second, once the commercial and legal risk of not licensing became clearer than the risk of overpaying for an uncertain claim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Casgevy and the Cost of Waiting: Why Rivals Folded Their Own Programs<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Casgevy’s approval covers roughly 16,000 patients with sickle cell disease who have recurrent vaso-occlusive crises.[26]<\/sup> Bluebird Bio’s Lyfgenia, a lentiviral (non-CRISPR) gene therapy, was approved the same day for the same population, using an entirely different editing mechanism and therefore a different patent estate.[43]<\/sup> But several would-be CRISPR-based competitors did not reach approval at all. Graphite Bio, Sangamo Therapeutics, and a Novartis-partnered Intellia program each shelved their own sickle cell disease candidates as exa-cel’s approval became likely, according to reporting on the FDA clearance.[27]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

That decision reflects two overlapping risks rather than one. The first is ordinary competitive risk: being second to market against a curative, one-time therapy is a weak commercial position. The second is patent risk specific to the platform: any competing program built on Cas9 editing carried the same unresolved Broad\/CVC ownership question that Vertex ultimately paid to settle, and a company without Vertex’s balance sheet, or without Vertex’s willingness to commercialize first and license later, had less room to absorb that uncertainty. Sherkow has argued that waiting to license makes sense for some developers precisely because the size of any pre-resolution discount has been shrinking over time, while getting a license from the wrong party before the interference resolves risks paying twice.[21]<\/sup> A platform patent that pushes competitors to abandon clinical programs rather than negotiate a license is not preventing infringement. It is preventing entry, which is a different and, for public health purposes, more costly outcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Older Platforms, Same Pattern: Zinc Finger Nucleases and the Anticommons Problem<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The CRISPR dispute is the most visible example, but it is not new behavior for gene-editing platforms. Sangamo Therapeutics built its zinc finger nuclease (ZFN) business by acquiring or licensing patent rights from multiple, otherwise-unconnected sources, including Johns Hopkins University, the University of Utah, Caltech, and the Scripps Research Institute, consolidating what had originally been a dispersed set of claims into a single controlling position.[30]<\/sup> Academic literature on the ZFN landscape framed this consolidation explicitly around the risk of an anticommons: too many independent rights holders, each capable of blocking downstream use, driving up transaction costs for anyone trying to combine the underlying components into a working therapeutic.[30]<\/sup> Sangamo’s response, buying up the fragmented rights, solved the anticommons problem for itself but recreated the same foundational-gatekeeper dynamic that now defines CRISPR: one company sits between an entire editing mechanism and everyone who wants to use it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

TALEN and Meganucleases: Precision Biosciences v. Cellectis<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A parallel, less publicized dispute plays out around older engineered-nuclease platforms. Precision Biosciences, which controls a portfolio of more than fifteen allowed genome-engineering patents covering its meganuclease-based Directed Nuclease Editor technology, asserted twelve of those patents against Cellectis, the TALEN-platform company, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.[31]<\/sup> Cellectis had itself licensed TALEN engineering rights from Martin Luther University and, together with Life Technologies and the Two Blades Foundation, built out a separate commercial platform for gene-editing reagents and therapeutics.[29]<\/sup> The Precision Biosciences and Cellectis dispute over their competing nuclease platforms reached a settlement in January 2014, following what contemporaneous legal commentary described as a prolonged legal standoff.[29]<\/sup> The episode predates CRISPR’s commercial rise by several years and shows the same structural issue recurring across every generation of programmable nuclease technology: platform-level claims from one gene-editing company reliably draw litigation from the next, regardless of which specific editing chemistry is at issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Platform<\/th>Core Patent Holders<\/th>Litigation\/Priority Events<\/th>Licensing Structure<\/th><\/tr><\/thead>
CRISPR-Cas9<\/td>Broad Institute\/MIT\/Harvard vs. UC Berkeley\/Vienna\/Charpentier<\/td>Two U.S. interferences (2014-2026, ongoing); EPO revocation (2018-2020, final); ToolGen and Sigma-Aldrich interferences paused<\/td>Surrogate licensees: Editas (Broad side); Caribou\/Intellia\/CRISPR Therapeutics\/ERS Genomics (UC side)<\/td><\/tr>
Base editing<\/td>Harvard (David Liu lab)\/Broad\/MIT\/MGH, sublicensed via Editas<\/td>No public interference; multi-party license stack assembled at company formation (2018)<\/td>Beam Therapeutics exclusive license; sublicensed to Verve Therapeutics for cardiovascular targets<\/td><\/tr>
Zinc finger nucleases (ZFN)<\/td>Sangamo, consolidating JHU\/Utah\/Caltech\/Scripps rights<\/td>Academic anticommons concerns over fragmented early rights; consolidated via acquisition rather than court battle<\/td>Sangamo controls core estate; licensed to Sigma-Aldrich for reagents<\/td><\/tr>
TALEN\/Meganuclease<\/td>Cellectis (TALEN, via Martin Luther University); Precision Biosciences (meganuclease)<\/td>Precision Biosciences v. Cellectis, 12 patents asserted, D. Del., settled Jan. 2014<\/td>Separate, competing platform companies; cross-licensing followed settlement<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Designing Around the Dispute Instead of Waiting for It: Mammoth Biosciences<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

One rational response to an unresolved foundational patent is to build a different foundational patent. Mammoth Biosciences, co-founded by Jennifer Doudna herself along with Janice Chen, Lucas Harrington, and Trevor Martin, exclusively licensed a separate set of University of California patents covering Cas12, Cas13, Cas14, and Cas-phi, novel CRISPR-associated enzymes identified through metagenomic screening rather than the Cas9 system at the center of the Broad\/CVC dispute.[38]<\/sup> Cas14 and Cas-phi proteins run roughly a third the size of Cas9, a practical advantage for viral-vector delivery as well as a legal one: an independent enzyme family sits outside the specific claims being litigated.[65]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

That strategy does not eliminate patent litigation risk; it relocates it. In 2023, Sherlock Biosciences publicly stated that any diagnostic use of Cas12 combined with nucleic acid amplification would require a license from Sherlock, a claim Mammoth disputed while noting its own broad CRISPR-based diagnostic IP portfolio.[39]<\/sup> A field created specifically to route around one contested platform patent produced its own overlapping claims within a decade. Platform-patent uncertainty in gene editing does not appear to suppress parallel invention. It appears to reliably generate it, and each new enzyme family becomes a new site for the same kind of dispute.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Four Ways Platform Patents Generate Litigation Risk Instead of Preventing It<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Across CRISPR-Cas9, base editing, ZFNs, and TALENs, the same four structural mechanics recur. None of them is unique to any one company or nucleic acid chemistry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. Priority-Dispute Risk<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Because foundational discoveries in gene editing were made by competing academic labs within months of each other, and because some of the relevant U.S. applications were filed before the 2013 shift to a first-inventor-to-file system, priority has to be established through interference proceedings that examine laboratory notebooks and conception dates rather than filing dates.[6]<\/sup> Those proceedings are described by patent practitioners as increasingly rare precisely because they are so resource-intensive, and the Broad\/CVC dispute is one of the last major examples working through the system.[13]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Formalities Risk<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Multi-institution, multi-inventor platform patents create administrative exposure that has nothing to do with the merits of the invention. Broad’s EPO revocation turned entirely on which named individuals appeared on a priority filing versus a later application, a defect that a single-university, single-inventor drug patent would not typically create.[15]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Licensing-Stack Risk<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Surrogate licensing distributes rights across universities, exclusive licensees, and sub-sublicensees, and each additional node is a separate contract that can be interpreted differently by the parties to it. The 2019 Intellia-Caribou arbitration over guide RNA modification rights shows this risk manifesting independently of, and without any bearing on, the underlying interference.[37]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

4. Design-Around Proliferation Risk<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Rather than deterring new entrants, an unresolved platform patent appears to push well-funded competitors toward discovering or engineering entirely new enzyme families, which then generate their own overlapping patent claims and licensing disputes, as with Mammoth’s Cas12\/13\/14\/Cas-phi portfolio and its dispute with Sherlock Biosciences.[38][39]<\/sup> The number of parties capable of asserting a claim against a given therapeutic program grows rather than shrinks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What This Means for Therapeutic Developers<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A company building a gene-editing pipeline on any single platform inherits that platform’s entire unresolved litigation history, whether or not the company is a party to any of the underlying cases. Freedom-to-operate analysis for a CRISPR-based program in 2026 has to track two active U.S. interferences, a finalized but partial European revocation, two paused parallel interferences, and the specific sublicense terms of whichever surrogate licensee the company has signed with.[1][3][14]<\/sup> DrugPatentWatch’s own patent-landscaping tools are built around exactly this kind of multi-layered ownership tracking, because a single Orange Book-style expiration date does not exist for a platform technology that has no single expiration date to track.[a]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

What This Means for Investors and Competitive Intelligence Teams<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Vertex-Editas timeline is the clearest signal available: it may be commercially rational to commercialize a gene-editing product before the underlying patent ownership is fully resolved, then negotiate a license once regulatory and commercial success make the cost of a lawsuit clearer than the cost of a license. That is a defensible strategy for a company with Vertex’s balance sheet. It is a much harder strategy for a smaller developer, which is one plausible reason several sickle cell disease programs were shelved rather than raced to market against Casgevy.[27]<\/sup> Tracking not just patent expiration dates but the status of interference proceedings, sublicense arbitration, and parallel foreign revocations has become a required input for anyone underwriting a gene-editing platform bet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Happens Next<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Broad\/CVC dispute is not over. The March 2026 PTAB decision and its June 2026 reaffirmation resolve this specific interference on the current record, but CVC retains further appeal rights, and the parallel ToolGen and Sigma-Aldrich interferences have not yet been unpaused.[3][11]<\/sup> Wilson Sonsini’s own analysis after the March 2026 ruling stated plainly that it could take several more years and additional legal proceedings before the question of who ultimately controls CRISPR-Cas9 rights in eukaryotic cells is settled.[3]<\/sup> Thirteen years in, the honest answer to “who owns CRISPR” is still: it depends which jurisdiction, which specific claim, and which year you ask.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Methodology<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This analysis draws on primary legal sources, including Federal Circuit opinions, PTAB interference decisions, and EPO Board of Appeal rulings, supplemented by SEC filings, company press releases, and law-firm and trade-press coverage of each proceeding. Litigation cost estimates are attributed directly to the named sources (Jacob Sherkow’s public estimates and the University of California’s disclosed legal spending) and are not independently recalculated. Patent family counts are drawn from a third-party analytics report and are presented as reported, not verified against the underlying USPTO\/EPO\/WIPO records directly. Company-to-company licensing relationships are sourced to primary announcements (press releases, SEC filings) wherever available, with secondary industry coverage used only for context or where primary sources were not accessible. Dates and case numbers are cross-checked across at least two independent sources where possible. This piece does not attempt to forecast the outcome of the pending appeal rights in the Broad\/CVC dispute or the paused ToolGen and Sigma-Aldrich interferences; those are identified as unresolved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Key Takeaways<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
    \n
  • The core CRISPR-Cas9 priority dispute between the Broad Institute and the University of California\/Vienna\/Charpentier group has run for more than thirteen years (2012 priority filing to the June 2026 reaffirmation), through two separate interference proceedings and two Federal Circuit appeals.[1][2][8]<\/sup><\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Broad’s parallel European patent on the same technology was fully revoked in 2018 over an inventorship-transfer formality unrelated to the underlying science, a decision upheld on appeal in 2020.[14][16]<\/sup><\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Two further interferences, involving ToolGen and Sigma-Aldrich, remain paused pending the outcome of the Broad\/CVC case.[3]<\/sup><\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Vertex Pharmaceuticals paid Editas Medicine up to $100 million to license Cas9 rights in December 2023, four days after Casgevy’s FDA approval, rather than before.[25][26]<\/sup><\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Multiple competing sickle cell disease gene-editing programs, including efforts at Sangamo Therapeutics, Graphite Bio, and a Novartis\/Intellia collaboration, were shelved as Casgevy’s approval became likely.[27]<\/sup><\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • Independent licensing disputes have emerged one and two degrees removed from the core interference, including a 2019 Intellia-Caribou arbitration over sublicense scope and a public licensing disagreement between Mammoth Biosciences and Sherlock Biosciences over Cas12 diagnostic rights.[37][39]<\/sup><\/li>\n\n\n\n
  • A third-party analytics report counts 17,590 CRISPR-related patent families worldwide as of 2026, concentrated among five institutional and corporate assignees.[4]<\/sup><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n

    Frequently Asked Questions<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

    Who legally owns the patent on CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    As of the June 2026 PTAB reaffirmation, the Broad Institute, MIT, and Harvard hold priority over the University of California, University of Vienna, and Emmanuelle Charpentier group for CRISPR-Cas9 use in eukaryotic cells in the United States.[2]<\/sup> The decision remains subject to further appeal, and a separate European patent covering similar subject matter was revoked in 2018.[14]<\/sup> No single answer covers every jurisdiction or every specific claim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Is the CRISPR patent dispute finally resolved in 2026?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    No. The PTAB reaffirmed Broad’s priority in March and June 2026, but legal commentary following the ruling noted that further appeals and additional proceedings, including the still-paused ToolGen and Sigma-Aldrich interferences, could take several more years to resolve.[3][11]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    What happened to Broad Institute’s CRISPR patent in Europe?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    The European Patent Office revoked Broad’s patent EP2771468 in January 2018 after finding it was not entitled to its earliest priority date, because an inventor named on the priority filing (whose rights had gone to Rockefeller University) was not listed as an applicant on the later European filing. The EPO Board of Appeal upheld the revocation in January 2020, and it is now final.[14][15][16]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    How much did Vertex Pharmaceuticals pay to license CRISPR technology for Casgevy?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    Vertex agreed to pay Editas Medicine up to $100 million, plus additional licensing fees, for rights to the Cas9 patent estate Editas exclusively licenses from Broad, Harvard, MIT, and Rockefeller University. The deal was announced December 12, 2023, four days after Casgevy’s FDA approval.[25]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Why did other companies stop developing CRISPR-based sickle cell disease therapies?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    Graphite Bio, Sangamo Therapeutics, and a Novartis-partnered Intellia program each shelved competing sickle cell disease candidates as Vertex and CRISPR Therapeutics’ Casgevy neared and then received FDA approval in December 2023.[27]<\/sup> Reporting on the decision does not attribute it to a single cause, but it followed years of unresolved platform-patent litigation across the CRISPR field.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    What is a platform patent, and how is it different from a typical drug patent?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    A platform patent claims a foundational method or mechanism, such as a gene-editing chemistry, rather than a single approved product. One platform patent can sit upstream of dozens of unrelated clinical programs, so a dispute over its ownership affects every company using the platform, not just the parties to the underlying case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Who has to pay to use CRISPR-Cas9 for a new gene therapy?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    Companies typically need a license from one of the surrogate licensees on each side of the dispute: Editas Medicine on the Broad\/Harvard\/MIT side, or Caribou Biosciences, Intellia Therapeutics, CRISPR Therapeutics, or ERS Genomics on the University of California\/Vienna\/Charpentier side, depending on the intended field of use and target.[1][22][35]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    What is the difference between CRISPR-Cas9, zinc finger nuclease, and TALEN patent estates?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    Each uses a different DNA-targeting mechanism and sits under a separate patent estate and licensing structure. Zinc finger nucleases are controlled primarily by Sangamo Therapeutics, which consolidated fragmented early academic rights.[30]<\/sup> TALENs were commercialized by Cellectis under a license from Martin Luther University, and separately litigated against Precision Biosciences’ meganuclease patents in 2013-2014.[29][31]<\/sup> CRISPR-Cas9 is split between the Broad and CVC surrogate-licensee networks described above.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    How many CRISPR-related patent families exist worldwide?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    A 2026 analytics report counted 17,590 patent families in scope, with the University of California, Harvard, Regeneron, MIT, and the Broad Institute holding the largest individual positions.[4]<\/sup> The report characterizes the field as having reached a maturity stage, with filing volume plateauing since roughly 2022.[4]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    What is a patent interference proceeding, and why does it still apply to CRISPR?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    An interference is a USPTO proceeding used to determine which of two or more applicants first invented a claimed invention, applicable only to applications filed before the U.S. shifted to a first-inventor-to-file system in 2013. Because the original CRISPR-Cas9 applications from both Broad and the CVC group were filed before that date, their priority dispute had to be resolved through this increasingly rare mechanism rather than by comparing filing dates.[13]<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n\n\n\n

    References<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
      \n
    1. Broad Institute. (2026). Statements and background on CRISPR patent process<\/em>. Broad Institute. https:\/\/www.broadinstitute.org\/crispr\/journalists-statement-and-background-crispr-patent-process<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    2. Lam, A.-T., & Huntington, R. D. (2026, June 24). PTAB reaffirms Broad Institute priority in CRISPR-Cas9 Interference No. 106,115: What the decision signals for biotech innovation and patent strategy<\/em>. PTAB Law Blog, Rothwell Figg. https:\/\/www.ptablaw.com\/2026\/06\/24\/ptab-reaffirms-broad-institute-priority-in-crispr-cas9-interference-no-106-115\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    3. Wilson Sonsini. (2026, April). PTAB again rules in favor of Broad in CRISPR-Cas9 patent dispute<\/em>. https:\/\/www.wsgr.com\/en\/insights\/ptab-again-rules-in-favor-of-broad-in-crispr-cas9-patent-dispute.html<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    4. Patsnap. (2026, July 8). CRISPR gene editing patent landscape 2026<\/em>. https:\/\/www.patsnap.com\/resources\/blog\/rd-blog\/crispr-gene-editing-patent-landscape\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    5. Knobbe Martens. (2018). UC v. Broad Institute: No interference-in-fact in CRISPR genome editing applications<\/em>. JD Supra. https:\/\/www.jdsupra.com\/legalnews\/uc-v-broad-institute-no-interference-in-13204<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    6. GenomeWeb. (2018, September 10). Federal court hands Broad Institute victory in CRISPR patent fight against UC Berkeley<\/em>. https:\/\/www.genomeweb.com\/business-news\/federal-court-hands-broad-institute-victory-crispr-patent-fight-against-uc-berkeley<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    7. Morgan Lewis. (2022, March). PTAB issues decision awarding priority of invention of CRISPR gene editing patents to Broad Institute<\/em>. https:\/\/www.morganlewis.com\/pubs\/2022\/03\/ptab-issues-decision-awarding-priority-of-invention-of-crispr-gene-editing-patents-to-broad-institute<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    8. Wilson Sonsini. (2025, May). Federal Circuit revives CRISPR-Cas9 patent priority dispute<\/em>. https:\/\/www.wsgr.com\/en\/insights\/federal-circuit-revives-crispr-cas9-patent-priority-dispute.html<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    9. GenomeWeb. (2025, May). US appeals court sends UC Berkeley, Broad Institute back to the mat in CRISPR-Cas9 patent dispute<\/em>. https:\/\/www.genomeweb.com\/gene-editing-gene-silencing-crispr\/us-appeals-court-sends-uc-berkeley-broad-institute-back-mat<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    10. Patsnap Eureka. (2026, March 11). Federal Circuit affirms-in-part CRISPR patent ruling in Broad Institute v. UC Regents<\/em>. https:\/\/www.patsnap.com\/resources\/blog\/litigation\/federal-circuit-affirms-in-part-crispr-patent-ruling-in-broad-institute-v-uc-regents-patsnap-eureka\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    11. Wilson Sonsini. (2026, April). PTAB again rules in favor of Broad in CRISPR-Cas9 patent dispute<\/em> [duplicate citation consolidated with 3].<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    12. Knobbe Martens. (2026, April 7). One battle after another: Broad Institute wins at PTAB in CRISPR dispute<\/em>. https:\/\/www.knobbe.com\/blog\/one-battle-after-another-broad-institute-wins-at-ptab-in-crispr-dispute\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    13. Morrison Foerster. (2026, April 7). The PTAB reaffirms priority decision for CRISPR IP<\/em>. https:\/\/www.mofo.com\/resources\/insights\/260407-the-ptab-reaffirms-priority-decision-for-crispr-ip<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    14. IPKat. (2018, January 22). EPO revokes CRISPR patent \u2013 a clear cut case of invalid priority?<\/em> https:\/\/ipkitten.blogspot.com\/2018\/01\/epo-revokes-crispr-patent-clear-cut.html<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    15. D Young & Co. (2020, February 14). Broad Institute CRISPR patent revoked: lack of priority<\/em>. https:\/\/www.dyoung.com\/en\/knowledgebank\/articles\/crispr-broad-priority<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    16. Mondaq. (2020, January 20). Broad’s CRISPR\/Cas9 patent EP2771468 revoked by the European Patent Office<\/em>. https:\/\/www.mondaq.com\/uk\/patent\/885392\/broad39s-crisprcas9-patent-ep2771468-revoked-by-the-european-patent-office<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    17. Beck Greener. (2022). EPO revokes Broad Institute’s CRISPR patent<\/em>. https:\/\/www.beckgreener.com\/epo-revokes-broad-institutes-crispr-patent\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    18. Begley, S. (2016, August 16, updated 2023). CRISPR patent fight: The legal bills are soaring<\/em>. STAT News. https:\/\/www.statnews.com\/2016\/08\/16\/crispr-patent-fight-legal-bills-soaring\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    19. KQED Science. (2024, January 10). Making sense of the CRISPR patent dispute between the University of California and Broad<\/em>. https:\/\/www.kqed.org\/science\/1938007\/making-sense-of-the-crispr-patent-dispute-between-the-university-of-california-and-broad<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    20. University of Illinois College of Law. (2026). BioSpace quotes Sherkow on CRISPR patent dispute<\/em>. https:\/\/law.illinois.edu\/biospace-quotes-sherkow-on-crispr-patent-dispute\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    21. BioSpace. (2024). Ongoing CRISPR patent dispute complicates licensing but hasn’t deterred gene-editing investment<\/em>. https:\/\/www.biospace.com\/business\/ongoing-crispr-patent-dispute-complicates-licensing-but-hasnt-deterred-gene-editing-investment<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    22. Broad Institute. (2014, December 1). Broad Institute, Harvard, and MIT license CRISPR-Cas9 technology to Editas Medicine for therapeutic applications<\/em>. https:\/\/www.broadinstitute.org\/news\/broad-institute-harvard-and-mit-license-crispr-cas9-technology-editas-medicine-therapeutic<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    23. Labiotech. (2022, June 24). CRISPR: One patent to rule them all<\/em>. https:\/\/www.labiotech.eu\/in-depth\/crispr-patent-dispute-licensing\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    24. Editas Medicine. (2020, September). Editas Medicine announces U.S. Patent and Trademark Office grants the Broad Institute priority benefit in CRISPR interference<\/em>. https:\/\/ir.editasmedicine.com\/news-releases\/news-release-details\/editas-medicine-announces-us-patent-and-trademark-office-grants<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    25. Fierce Biotech. (2023, December 13). After long-running patent battle, Vertex pays $100M to license Editas’ gene-editing tech<\/em>. https:\/\/www.fiercebiotech.com\/biotech\/after-long-standing-patent-battle-vertex-pays-100m-license-editas-gene-editing-tech<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    26. Vertex Pharmaceuticals. (2023, December 8). Vertex and CRISPR Therapeutics announce US FDA approval of CASGEVY (exagamglogene autotemcel) for the treatment of sickle cell disease<\/em>. https:\/\/news.vrtx.com\/news-releases\/news-release-details\/vertex-and-crispr-therapeutics-announce-us-fda-approval<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    27. Big Molecule Watch. (2023, December 15). FDA approves first cell-based therapies for treatment of sickle cell disease<\/em>. https:\/\/www.bigmoleculewatch.com\/2023\/12\/14\/fda-approves-first-cell-based-therapies-for-treatment-of-sickle-cell-disease\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    28. Berkeley News. (2025, May 12). Federal appeals court sends CRISPR-Cas9 patent case back to patent office for reconsideration<\/em>. https:\/\/news.berkeley.edu\/2025\/05\/12\/federal-appeals-court-sends-crispr-cas9-patent-case-back-to-patent-office-for-reconsideration\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    29. Carroll, D., et al. (2016). Patent law and genome engineering: A short guide to a rapidly changing landscape<\/em>. Molecular Therapy. https:\/\/www.cell.com\/molecular-therapy-family\/molecular-therapy\/fulltext\/S1525-0016(16)30959-5<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    30. PMC\/National Institutes of Health. Proprietary science, open science and the role of patent disclosure: The case of zinc-finger proteins<\/em>. https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC2733216\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    31. Nanalyze. (2024, October 5). 7 gene editing companies investors should watch<\/em>. https:\/\/www.nanalyze.com\/2015\/04\/7-gene-editing-companies-investors-should-watch\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    32. Beam Therapeutics. (2022). Form ARS FY2022<\/em>. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. https:\/\/www.sec.gov\/Archives\/edgar\/data\/1745999\/000095017023013848\/updated_2023_ars.pdf<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    33. GenomeWeb. (2018, May). Gene editing startup Beam Therapeutics launches with $87M in Series A funds<\/em>. https:\/\/www.genomeweb.com\/business-news\/gene-editing-startup-beam-therapeutics-launches-87m-series-funds<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    34. Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News. (2019). Gene-editing cardiovascular therapy startup licenses CRISPR patents, partners with Beam<\/em>. https:\/\/www.genengnews.com\/news\/gene-editing-cardiovascular-therapy-startup-licenses-crispr-patents-partners-with-beam\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    35. Caribou Biosciences. (2014, November 18). Caribou Biosciences announces co-founding of Intellia Therapeutics<\/em>. https:\/\/investor.cariboubio.com\/news-releases\/news-release-details\/caribou-biosciences-announces-co-founding-intellia-therapeutics<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    36. Intellia Therapeutics. (2016, December 16). CRISPR Therapeutics, Intellia Therapeutics, Caribou Biosciences and ERS Genomics announce global agreement on the foundational intellectual property for CRISPR\/Cas9 gene editing technology<\/em>. https:\/\/ir.intelliatx.com\/news-releases\/news-release-details\/crispr-therapeutics-intellia-therapeutics-caribou-biosciences<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    37. GlobeNewswire. (2019, September 26). Arbitration decision affirms Intellia Therapeutics’ interpretation of licensing agreement with Caribou Biosciences on the CRISPR\/Cas9 technology<\/em>. https:\/\/www.globenewswire.com\/news-release\/2019\/09\/26\/1921595\/0\/en\/Arbitration-Decision-Affirms-Intellia-Therapeutics-Interpretation-of-Licensing-Agreement-with-Caribou-Biosciences-on-the-CRISPR-Cas9-Technology.html<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    38. Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News. (2023, June 9). Mammoth Biosciences licenses 2 UC patents for CRISPR-based diagnostic platform<\/em>. https:\/\/www.genengnews.com\/news\/mammoth-biosciences-licenses-2-uc-patents-for-crispr-based-diagnostic-platform\/<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    39. GEN Edge. (2023, June 9). Elementary claim: Sherlock gains patent rights for Cas12 in diagnostics<\/em>. https:\/\/www.genengnews.com\/gen-edge\/elementary-claim-sherlock-gains-patent-rights-for-cas12-in-diagnostics\/<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      Additional context notes: [a] references DrugPatentWatch’s general patent-landscaping methodology for small-molecule Orange Book patents, cited for contrast rather than as a source for gene-editing-specific claims. [b] references the surrogate-licensing framework as discussed in Contreras & Sherkow’s published legal scholarship on CRISPR licensing, summarized here rather than quoted. [43] Drugs.com and Big Molecule Watch coverage of Lyfgenia’s concurrent, non-CRISPR approval, cited above in reference 27.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      On March 26, 2026, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ruled, again, that the Broad Institute invented CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":39550,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","site-sidebar-layout":"default","site-content-layout":"","ast-site-content-layout":"default","site-content-style":"default","site-sidebar-style":"default","ast-global-header-display":"","ast-banner-title-visibility":"","ast-main-header-display":"","ast-hfb-above-header-display":"","ast-hfb-below-header-display":"","ast-hfb-mobile-header-display":"","site-post-title":"","ast-breadcrumbs-content":"","ast-featured-img":"","footer-sml-layout":"","ast-disable-related-posts":"","theme-transparent-header-meta":"","adv-header-id-meta":"","stick-header-meta":"","header-above-stick-meta":"","header-main-stick-meta":"","header-below-stick-meta":"","astra-migrate-meta-layouts":"default","ast-page-background-enabled":"default","ast-page-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-4)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"ast-content-background-meta":{"desktop":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"tablet":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""},"mobile":{"background-color":"var(--ast-global-color-5)","background-image":"","background-repeat":"repeat","background-position":"center center","background-size":"auto","background-attachment":"scroll","background-type":"","background-media":"","overlay-type":"","overlay-color":"","overlay-opacity":"","overlay-gradient":""}},"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-39548","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-insights"],"modified_by":"DrugPatentWatch","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39548","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=39548"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39548\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":39551,"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/39548\/revisions\/39551"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/39550"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=39548"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=39548"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.drugpatentwatch.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=39548"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}